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EDITORIAL
Economic growth in the euro area slowed 
slightly in the second quarter of the year, 
reflecting stagnation in private consumption 
and continued sluggishness in investment 
spending. However, there are good reasons 
to be optimistic about the prospects for an 
acceleration in economic activity in the 
second half of the year.  
The pick-up in industrial production, the 
expansion in world trade and the 
strengthening of business confidence 
indicators in recent months suggest that the 
recovery is gathering momentum. This is 
also captured by our short-term models, 
which predict a return to potential growth 
by the end of the year.   
Obviously, there are risks to this outlook. In 
the first instance, the current level of asset 
prices suggests that a strong economic 
recovery and a sustained low inflation rate 
may already be fully discounted by financial 
markets. The corollary is that an abrupt 
change in these expectations could lead to a 
sharp fall in some asset prices. This could 
result in a deterioration in the balance sheets 
of households, companies and financial 
intermediaries, with negative knock-on 
effects on economic growth and financial 
stability in the euro area.  
A second risk is the potential for a 
disorderly unwinding of global imbalances. 
This report devotes a special focus section 
to this issue, exploring the factors driving 
the rising current account deficit of the 
United States and the matching surplus of 
East Asia and the Middle East. It notes that 
although the euro area can only provide a 
limited contribution towards reducing global 
imbalances, particularly from its balanced 
starting position, it can strengthen its 
capacity to absorb the shock of a disorderly 
unwinding by enacting structural reforms. 
Another major source of uncertainty facing 
the euro area, and the world economy more 
generally, is rising oil prices. Since the 
beginning of the year, the price of a barrel 
of crude oil has increased by 60% in dollar 
terms and more than 70% in euro terms. It 
reached record nominal highs at the end of 
August following the devastation caused in 
the United States by Hurricane Katrina, 
before falling slightly in September. 
Rising oil prices cannot be dismissed as a 
short-term anomaly. They are driven by a 
range of deep-seated, structural factors, 
including growing global demand for oil, a 
shortage of spare capacity in oil-producing 
countries, a lack of investment in oil 
exploration and production in recent years  
and, of course, geo-political uncertainties. 
High oil prices appear, at least for some 
time, to be here to stay, with the markets 
predicting crude oil prices to remain in 
excess of 60 US dollars a barrel throughout 
2006 and 2007. 
Last month, in response to surging oil 
prices, the Commission discussed a five-
point action plan presented by 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs. Over the 
short- to medium-term, it recommends an 
increase in the supply of oil and gas, more 
refining capacity and better coordination of 
oil stocks at the Community level in 
response to emergency situations. Over the 
medium- to long-term, it calls for measures 
to promote greater transparency and 
predictability in oil markets and a switch to 
using alternative energy sources.  
In addition, it should be recognised that 
reducing excise duties or value-added taxes 
on oil products would not be appropriate. 
Such policies treat the high price of oil as a 
temporary shock from which consumers 
can be shielded, when in fact it is a long-
term challenge that has, sooner or later, to 
be faced up to. In addition to the risk that 
indirect tax cuts will reduce disincentives to 
consume oil, they could lead to a rise in 
government borrowing at a time when 
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Member States should be saving for the 
budgetary costs of ageing populations and 
using tax payers’ money effectively to 
stimulate growth and employment. 
If high oil prices persist over time, 
significant structural adjustment might be 
triggered, putting the global economy on a 
less oil-dependent path. For the euro area, 
this also means that new business 
opportunities will be created, alternative 
fuels will become more competitive and all 
kinds of energy-saving technologies, 
industries and services will be boosted. 
However, in the short-run, before such 
structural adjustments can be made, the 
reduction in disposable income from high 
oil prices is likely to have some dampening 
effect on short-term growth. 
On a more general note, the challenge of 
rising oil prices can be viewed as yet another 
example of how economic and political 
developments in one part of the world 
reverberate across the globe. While some 
might prefer to respond to globalisation by 
shirking its challenges or throwing sand in 
the wheels of international economic 
integration, these do not seem to be 
attractive options.  
The euro area has since long embraced the 
process of international trade integration, 
well defending its share in world markets. 
However, more recently, it has seemed less 
than ideally positioned to realise fully the 
potential gains from deeper international 
economic integration. An examination of 
the structure and geographical direction of 
trade flows suggests that the euro area may 
not have taken full advantage of 
opportunities in newly emerging markets.  
In order to make globalisation work for the 
euro area, its production structures will have 
to shift considerably towards both further 
specialisation and increased diversification 
into new areas of relative comparative 
advantage, and this process is likely to be 
associated with considerable frictions.  
Well-functioning labour markets that enable 
workers to move smoothly from declining 
to expanding activities will ease tensions in 
the adjustment process. In practice, this may 
often mean ensuring a better balance 
between income support for job losers, 
adequate job-finding assistance, training and 
proper re-employment incentives. However, 
meeting the broader challenge from 
globalisation requires policy responses that 
extend far beyond labour market and social-
safety-net policies.  
The euro area needs to enhance its ability to 
create new activities and jobs in order to 
“take the high road” in the emerging new 
international division of labour. Producing 
only goods and services reflecting traditional 
comparative advantage will not be enough 
in the long-run. Rather, creating new high 
value-added activities with deeply rooted 
comparative advantage requires a dynamic 
and competitive framework where 
innovation and R&D, fostered by excellent 
education systems, can spur productivity 
and job growth. Clearly, without such a 
dynamic approach, no new jobs will be 
created to replace the jobs lost, thus 
jeopardising public support for economic 
openness. The Lisbon strategy, with its 
focus on employment and productivity, has 
a key role to play in this respect. 
 
Klaus REGLING  
DIRECTOR GENERAL 
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I. Economic situation in the euro area 
After a modest acceleration in the first quarter of the year, GDP growth in the euro area slowed slightly to 0.3% in the 
second quarter. The high level of oil prices has taken its toll and is a major source of uncertainty surrounding the short-term 
outlook. Nevertheless, although market developments indicate that oil prices could remain high for a longer period than 
previously expected, several factors suggest that the recovery in the euro area is gathering momentum. After a soft patch at the 
beginning of the year, world trade has shown signs of an improvement and is expected to withstand the negative impact of high 
oil prices and Hurricane Katrina. Euro-area exporters will also benefit from the lagged effect of the weakening of the euro 
registered during the first half of the year. On the domestic side, business confidence strengthened over the summer while 
industrial production edged up again in June and July. In addition, recent developments in bond and equity markets have 
been particularly conducive to growth. Both government bond yields and risk premiums on corporate bonds have declined to 
historical lows. The rising trend in equity prices has accelerated in the course of 2005 and equity markets in the euro-area 
have tended to outperform US markets. Developments in asset prices reflect investors’ expectations of strong growth and 
sustained low inflation in the global economy. Combined with improved bank-lending conditions, rising equity and bond 
prices have led to a further easing of long-term financing conditions in the euro area. The easing has been associated with early 
signs of a pick-up in corporate demand for external funding and continued rapid expansion in loans to households.  
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects1  
Higher oil prices are weighing on the 
recovery 
The high level of oil prices has weighed on 
growth during the first half of the year and is 
presently one of the main sources of uncertainty 
surrounding the outlook for both the euro area 
and the world economy. Over the summer, oil 
                                                     
1
  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 30 September 2005. 
prices continued to increase, driven by concerns 
about supply disruptions and shortage of refining 
capacity. In particular, Hurricane Katrina is 
estimated to have halted production of oil by 
around 1.5 million barrels per day (mb/d.) 
according to the US government. In comparison, 
global production was 84.7 mb/d. in July, 
according to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA). As a result, oil prices initially jumped to 
new record levels in nominal terms, with the 
price of Brent crude futures climbing to around 
68 USD/bl. around the end of August and the 
 
 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
Forecast (1) 
 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
Carryover 
to 2005 
2005 (2) 2006 (2) 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.6 2.1 
Private consumption 
0.2 0.8 0.2 -0.1 0.9 1.6 1.8 
Government consumption 0.4 -0.3 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.0 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.6 2.8 3.7 
Changes in inventories (% of GDP) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Exports of goods and services 1.3 0.5 -0.7 2.1 2.5 5.5 5.9 
Imports of goods and services 2.5 1.4 -1.4 2.1 3.1 6.0 6.4 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 
0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.0 
Government consumption 
0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Gross fixed capital formation 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.8 
Changes in inventories 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Net exports -0.4 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
(1) Annual change in %.         (2) European Commission Spring 2005 Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
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beginning of September before easing somewhat.  
Graph 1: Oil prices 
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Source: Commission services. 
An even bigger concern may, however, be the 
impact of Hurricane Katrina on US refinery 
capacity, which was already stretched to the limit. 
Hurricane Katrina initially disrupted up to 20% 
of US refinery capacity leading to a more than 
30% rise in US gasoline prices. The shortage of 
petrol in the US also led to an increase in prices 
in Europe, as petrol is being exported to the US.  
The decision of IEA Member States on 
2 September to release an equivalent of 2 mb/d. 
of crude oil from reserves for an initial period of 
30 days brought crude oil prices down from their 
record levels and reduced the pressure on petrol 
prices, but the prices of both remain high. On 30 
September the Brent was trading at around 63.5 
USD/bl. 
Graph 2: Real oil prices in perspective (1) 
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(1) Deflator of private consumption. 
Source: Commission services. 
Since the end of last year, the price of oil 
(monthly averages) has risen by close to 60% in 
US dollars and more than 70% when measured 
in euro terms. However, the current price level in 
real terms and the pace of the recent price 
increases remain below the supply-driven price 
shock of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In real 
terms, the current price level is approximately 
30% below the record highs of the early 1980s in 
Table 2: Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2004-2005 
 
SENT. IND
1) 
BCI
2) 
OECD
3) 
PMI Man.
4) 
PMI Ser 
5)
 IFO
6) 
NBB
7) 
ZEW
8)
 
Long-term average
 
100.9 0.00 2.75 52.1 54.2 95.6 -10.8 29.4 
Trough in latest 
downturn 
88.1 -1.25 -0.77 42.9 46.7 87.3 -26.5 -10.4 
September 2004 
100.9 
0.52 2.23 
53.1 53.3 95.7 -1.1 38.4 
October 2004 
101.5 
0.54 1.96 
52.4 53.5 95.9 -0.5 31.3 
November 2004 
100.9 
0.40 1.88 
50.4 52.6 94.3 -6.6 13.9 
December 2004 
100.2 
0.45 1.44 
51.4 52.7 96.4 -5.3 14.4 
January 2005 
100.8 
0.41 1.17 
51.9 53.4 97.5 -5.0 26.9 
February 2005 
98.8 
0.21 0.79 
51.9 53.0 96.3 -11.4 35.9 
March 2005 
97.5 
-0.09 0.25 
50.4 53.0 94.6 -9.4 36.3 
April 2005 
96.5 
-0.28 -0.17 
49.2 52.8 93.6 -15.9 20.1 
May 2005 
96.1 
-0.37 -0.43 
48.7 53.5 92.4 -16.1 13.9 
June 2005 
96.3 
-0.27 -0.31 
49.9 53.1 92.9 -14.4 19.5 
July 2005 
97.3 
-0.10 0.03 
50.8 53.5 95.1 -13.8 37.0 
August 2005 
97.8 
-0.10  
50.4 53.4 95.4 -14.1 50.0 
September 2005 98.6 0.10  
51.7 54.7 95.5 -7.0 38.6 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Business climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading indicator, six monthly 
change. 4) Reuters Purchasing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  Reuters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Business expectations, 
West Germany. 7)  National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) Business expectations of financial market analysts, Germany. 
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US dollar terms and 50% below its peak of the 
1980s in euro terms (Graph 2).  
Several factors imply upside risks to oil prices. 
Although slowing, demand is projected to remain 
strong. In its September report, the IEA 
projected oil demand to increase by 1.6% in 2005 
and 2.1% in 2006. This is still robust in a 
historical context, although down from 3.7% in 
2004. In addition, in a more short-term 
perspective, the approaching northern 
hemisphere winter season could also create some 
upward pressure on prices.  
But the recent surge in oil prices is mostly seen 
to be due to concerns about supply 
developments. Under-investment in both crude 
production and refinery capacity, as a reaction to 
low oil prices and excess capacity in the refining 
sector between the mid-1980s and the turn of the 
century, constrained supply capacities. Ongoing 
price volatility can be expected until new supply 
capacity comes on line. While higher prices 
should boost investment in new oil production 
and alternative energy sources, it takes 3–10 years 
for new investment in supply capacity to enter 
the market, so the low level of spare capacity is 
likely to persist for some time. Lastly, ongoing 
geopolitical tensions and political stability issues 
are likely to continue to feed the uncertainty 
about supply, thereby adding to the risk premium 
in oil prices. 
Graph 3: Oil price expectations 
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Source: Commission services. 
All in all, it is likely to take some time for prices 
to seriously affect the balance of supply and 
demand. This increases the probability that prices 
will remain high in the medium term or even that 
further price spikes will occur in the coming 
months. Current futures prices indicate that the 
price of Brent crude oil will remain well above 60 
USD/bl. in the medium to longer term 
(Graph 3). Compared to the assumption in the 
Commission services’ spring forecast of an 
average price of 48 USD/bl. in 2006, the oil price 
currently suggested by futures prices would be 
about 35% higher at around 65 USD/bl.  
The pace of global economic growth has 
withstood rising energy prices quite well and the 
recycling of oil revenues should provide a boost 
to European exports in particular. However, the 
prospect of prolonged higher price levels and 
further volatility in oil prices needs to be 
considered as a risk factor for sustained 
economic recovery and growth, especially in oil-
importing countries. Calculations based on 
simulations with DG ECFIN’s QUEST model 
suggest that a permanent 35% increase in oil 
prices would shave off 0.4 of a percentage point 
of GDP growth in the first year and 0.2 of a 
percentage point in the second while pushing 
inflation by about 0.3 of a percentage point 
during the two years (Table 3).
2
  
Table 3: Effect of a permanent oil price shock, 
euro area (35% increase from 48 to 65 USD/bl)   
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
GDP -0.43 -0.64 -0.76 
GDP growth -0.43 -0.21 -0.11 
Consumer 
price level 
0.32 0.66 0.63 
Consumer 
price inflation 
0.32 0.34 -0.04 
Source: Commission services. 
 
This result reflects two offsetting factors. On the 
one hand, non-linearity effects may play an 
important role in the relationship between energy 
prices and economic growth, in that a one 
percentage-point rise in the price of oil from a 
                                                     
2
  These calculations take into account the repercussions of 
global trade, with lower demand from oil-importing 
countries counterbalanced somewhat by higher demand 
from the oil-exporting countries, which benefit from the 
higher price of oil. They also take into account the fact oil 
prices affect natural gas prices with a lag of about 6 
months. 
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relatively high level (as observed since 2002), may 
lead to a stronger adverse impact on the 
economy than the same rise from a lower price 
level. On the other hand, there is some evidence 
that the demand for imports by oil exporting 
countries is now strongly increasing to the 
benefit of euro-area exporters, whose market 
share is rising in those countries.
3
 It is likely that 
higher oil revenues will continue to be partly 
channelled into imports from the euro area, thus 
allowing foreign demand to provide ongoing 
support to growth in the euro area. 
The growth momentum was weak in the first 
half of the year… 
The latest national account data show that 
growth in the euro area slowed slightly from 
0.4% q-o-q in the first quarter to 0.3% in the 
second on the back of a weakening of domestic 
demand in a number of Member States. Private 
consumption contracted slightly as higher energy 
prices weighed on households’ confidence and 
disposable income. Investment spending 
recovered slightly in the second quarter, but it 
continues to be relatively weak. 
More encouraging, however, was the strong 
rebound of exports, which grew by 2.1% q-o-q, 
benefiting from the earlier weakening of the euro 
exchange rate. However, imports also increased 
at a similar pace, so that net external demand 
made no positive contribution to GDP growth in 
the second quarter. Overall, therefore, the main 
contribution in the second quarter mostly came 
from inventories.  
Given the fact that the slightly stronger first-
quarter growth (although revised down to 0.4% 
q-o-q from 0.5% q-o-q) was partly due to 
working day adjustments, it appears that the 
euro-area economic recovery was not able to 
regain pace in the first half of the year following 
the slowdown in the second half of 2004. 
Growth dispersion among euro-area countries 
remained wide in the second quarter of the year, 
with a 1.2% q-o-q contraction in Finland, almost 
flat activity in Germany (0.0%) and France 
                                                     
3
  Since 2003, euro-area exports to OPEC, the CIS and 
Norway have increased twice as fast as total extra-area 
exports. See also ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2005. 
(0.1%), and relatively strong activity in Italy 
(0.7%), the Netherlands (1.2%) and Spain (0.9%). 
However, some of the recent dispersion in 
growth rates is also likely to be due to the effects 
of working day adjustments. 
Graph 4: GDP growth in selected euro area countries 
(2004Q3 to 2005Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
A weakening of domestic demand, following the 
improvement in the second half of 2004, was 
behind the moderate level of growth in the first 
half of the year. Consumer confidence fell 
somewhat in the first half of the year, partly 
reflecting the impact of higher energy prices on 
disposable income. Nevertheless, modest 
employment growth continued to provide some 
support to private consumption. Euro-area 
employment grew by 0.1% in the first quarter of 
2005, while the unemployment rate in the second 
quarter, at 8.8%, was unchanged for the third 
quarter in a row. 
Investment spending failed to build on the 
momentum achieved in the second half of last 
year. Despite solid earnings growth and 
supportive financing conditions, it was 
considerably weaker than expected in the first 
half of the year. Although revised national 
accounts data show a more modest drop in gross 
fixed capital formation in the first quarter (0.2% 
q-o-q compared to the previous estimate of 
0.7%), data also show that the growth in 
investment was weaker than previously estimated 
in the fourth quarter of last year. Furthermore, 
investment spending only rebounded modestly in 
the second quarter (0.2% q-o-q). 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 9 - 
The breakdown of investment spending by 
sector is not yet available for the second quarter. 
Available data for the first quarter show that the 
weakness of capital formation in the first months 
of the year was essentially attributable to 
construction. Bad weather conditions, in 
particular, contributed to a contraction in 
construction investment, especially in Germany 
and Italy. In contrast, investment in equipment 
experienced some positive momentum, picking 
up from 0.4% in the last quarter of 2004 to 0.8% 
in the first quarter of 2005.  
All in all, investment spending remains well 
below the level seen in previous recoveries, even 
taking into account the fact that this recovery is 
relatively modest. Contrary to previous 
recoveries, investment spending has not 
increased as a share of GDP, so far (see 
Graph 5). This suggests that on top of the effects 
of the sluggishness of the recovery, investment 
may be being held back by a number of longer-
term factors related to the slowdown in total 
factor productivity growth in the euro area and 
by labour force developments.
4
  
Graph 5: The investment/GDP ratio in the euro area 
during different recoveries  
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
4
  See ‘Structural factors weighing on the investment 
recovery’, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, Volume 4 
No. 1 (2005). 
…but growth is expected to pick up in the 
second half of the year  
After the slowdown in the second quarter, in line 
with a soft patch in the global economy, some 
signs of an improving economic climate emerged 
over the summer. The improvement in industrial 
production figures in the early summer has 
resulted in a positive three-month moving 
average growth rate for euro-area industrial 
production, driven in particular by strong 
industrial activity in Germany. In July, the 
available data were mixed, with continued strong 
momentum in Germany, whereas activity was 
weak in France. On the whole, the advance in 
industrial production may suggest a further 
expansion of equipment investment, although 
the rise in capital spending is likely to remain 
constrained by the prevailing low level of 
capacity utilisation. 
On the consumer side, hard data point to 
continued weak momentum, judging from the 
retail-sales data. Retail sales were down in July, 
following an already relatively weak performance 
in June. Car-sales data (which are not included in 
the retail-sales data), on the other hand, are 
indicating more optimism. In June 2005, new 
passenger-car registrations in the euro area 
reached their highest level since April 2001. 
According to Commission services’ calculations, 
second-quarter car registrations should be up 
4.4% q-o-q (seasonally adjusted). 
Latest surveys indicate that, after a substantial 
deterioration in the second quarter, business 
confidence strengthened again over the summer. 
The improvement was particularly significant in 
the export-oriented manufacturing sector where 
the Business Climate Indicator (BCI) returned 
above its long-term average in September. In 
contrast, gains were only modest in the more 
domestic oriented service sectors. However, the 
construction sector showed a marked 
improvement in August and September. Overall, 
development in business surveys suggest that the 
recent improvement of sentiment is probably 
largely a reflection of better export prospects, 
which in turn have been supported by the 
relative weakness of the euro (compared to the 
start of the year) and robust growth in 
international trade.  
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Graph 6: Main surveys indicators, euro area 
(Jan 1989 to Sep 2005) 
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(1) Normalised. 
Source: Commission services. 
The recent evolution of consumer survey results 
contrasts with the developments in business 
survey, as higher energy prices (accentuated by 
the weaker euro) have dented household 
sentiment. The Commission consumer 
confidence indicator stood in July at its lowest 
level since end-2003 and improved only 
marginally in August and September. Weak 
sentiment reflects expectations of higher prices 
and concerns about economic growth. 
Households’ concerns regarding unemployment 
intensified in the spring but eased slightly again 
during the course of the summer. This is in line 
with a very mild improvement in labour market 
conditions in the past few months. The 
unemployment rate edged down slightly from 
8.8% in April to 8.6% in July. Over the summer, 
business surveys also showed some encouraging 
signs of a pick-up of employment expectations, 
mostly in the services and construction sectors.  
Overall, survey results seem to suggest that the 
euro-area economy is heading, in the short-term, 
towards a pattern of modest growth in 
consumption, stronger investment and a 
significant growth contribution from net exports. 
Looking forward, DG ECFIN’s indicator-based 
model for quarterly GDP growth for the euro 
area forecasts a range of 0.2% to 0.6% for the 
third quarter and 0.4% to 0.8% for the fourth 
quarter of 2005. The lagged effects of favourable 
exchange rate developments and an improved 
international environment are the main factors 
behind the higher fourth-quarter projection of 
the model. A mechanical calculation, using the 
projected quarterly growth rates for the third and 
fourth quarters along with the outcome for the 
first two quarters, would suggest annual GDP 
growth in 2005 of around 1.2% (non-working-
day-adjusted). This is below the spring forecast 
of 1.6%, mainly as a consequence of weaker-
than-expected growth in the first half of the year. 
Graph 7: Euro-area GDP growth rate 
(% change on previous quarter – 2003Q1 to 2005Q4) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Risks to the growth outlook are again tilted 
to the downside 
Despite the projection of a gradual return to 
potential growth in the second half of the year, 
the outlook is subject mainly to downside risks 
linked to the international environment and 
domestic demand.  
Regarding the international environment, 
Hurricane Katrina is likely to impact US growth 
adversely in the second half of the year. 
Furthermore, the energy market remains tight 
and further increases in the prices of crude oil 
and refined oil products cannot be ruled out. 
Although the global economy has so far coped 
well with higher oil prices, and financial markets 
appear to be relatively sanguine about downside 
risks emanating from soaring oil prices, oil prices 
should be considered a risk factor for sustained 
economic recovery and growth, particularly in 
countries that are heavily dependent on oil 
imports.  
Another downside risk related to the global 
economy is the possible disorderly unwinding of 
global imbalances associated with the rising 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 11 - 
current account deficit of the USA and the 
matching surplus in East Asia and the Middle 
East (see Focus section in this issue). Finally, a 
possible abrupt shift in investor expectations 
regarding global economic growth and inflation 
could lead to a severe correction in some asset 
prices. The current level of asset prices suggests 
that a sustained economic recovery and low 
inflation are fully discounted in asset prices. 
Revisions in these expectations would impact 
both financial markets and the real economy.  
Domestic demand remains fragile, and risks are 
mainly on the downside, notwithstanding 
supportive financial conditions. The outlook for 
private consumption is held back by weak 
consumer confidence, which may partly reflect 
the adverse effect of higher energy prices on real 
disposable income growth. Moreover, it remains 
unclear whether labour market conditions will 
improve sufficiently to provide a boost to 
consumer confidence and spending.  
The more positive outlook for the industrial 
sector, together with the support from low 
interest rates and improving balance sheets, 
provides some grounds for optimism regarding a 
pick-up in investment spending. On the other 
hand, the sluggish investment performance to 
date during this recovery would argue for that 
optimism to remain cautious. 
Global growth is expected to remain resilient 
There are some signs that the deceleration in 
world growth observed in the second half of 
2004 and early 2005 has come to an end. 
Notably, world trade seems to have somewhat 
picked up recently, with the year-on-year rate of 
increase rising from a 19-months low of 4.5% in 
March to almost 8% in May, before easing again 
to about 6% in June and July. Survey results 
also point to a bottoming out of the world cycle. 
According to the latest reading of the quarterly 
World Economic Survey from August 2005
5
, the 
world economic climate stabilised at a level 
above its long-term average in the third quarter, 
following five consecutive negative readings. The 
                                                     
5
  The WES is carried out by the IFO institute with the 
financial support of the European Commission. It is 
based on interviews with economic forecasters, 
researchers and policy makers around the world.  
indicator showing expectations for six months 
ahead even picked up slightly. The improvement 
has been concentrated in North America and 
Asia. 
Graph 8: World trade 
(% y-o-y changes in volume, Jan 2000 to July 2005) 
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Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis. 
The US economy expanded at an annual rate of 
3.3% in the second quarter, with consumer 
spending and fixed investments continuing to 
advance robustly. An inventory correction 
exerted a strong drag on growth, but most of it 
was offset by a positive contribution from 
external trade, as export growth accelerated and 
import growth stagnated in volume terms. 
Stagnating real imports reflected the relative 
softness in the manufacturing sector in the 
second quarter, but the improving trade 
performance should also be seen against the 
background of the 15% real effective 
depreciation of the dollar in the preceding three 
years.  
GDP growth in the third quarter will benefit 
from strong growth in personal consumption 
expenditure in June and July, which was spurred 
by a boom in auto sales. Also, the momentum in 
investment activity seems to have been 
maintained. However, Hurricane Katrina has 
caused output loss from disruptions to economic 
activity in the region (see Box 1). The disaster has 
also reduced energy supplies, resulting in hefty 
price increases, for petrol in particular, on top of 
already surging energy prices. This is cutting into 
consumers’ purchasing power and is reducing 
their overall spending in real terms. The direct 
effects of the hurricane will already dampen  
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Box 1: The economic consequences Hurricane Katrina on the US economy  
 
Hurricane Katrina hit the US Gulf coast at the end of August causing a large loss of life and enormous material 
damage. Less than a month later, the Gulf coast was hit by another severe hurricane, named Rita. Munich Re, the 
world’s largest reinsurance company, estimated on 28 September that Katrina and Rita would lead to claims on the 
insurance industry of $30 billion and $5-10 billion, respectively. These figures do not include the flood and storm-
surge losses covered under the National Flood Insurance Program, nor uninsured losses which typically run up to a 
similar size as insured losses. This means, that the two hurricanes together may have destroyed material wealth of 
around $100 billion although accurate estimates are still difficult to make at this stage. However, wealth destruction 
has only an impact on the national income accounts to the extent that consumer and business spending is affected. 
While private spending may decline temporarily, the process of cleaning up and rebuilding productive capacity and 
distribution facilities will show up as production, contributing positively to GDP growth. Apart from the wealth 
destruction, a number of economic consequences will follow: 
 
Disruption: The “first round” negative impact of the disaster is the loss of output caused by the disruptions. Katrina 
may have pushed down the level of US GDP by 0.5 – 1 % because the three states affected by the hurricane account 
for 3.2% of US GDP and the level of economic activity in this region is estimated to have fallen by 15-30% below 
normal. The duration of this effect may be a few months. 
 
Higher energy prices: In the second quarter of 2005, US households spent 5.4% of their disposable personal 
income on energy goods and services. A 15% rise in energy prices in the wake of Katrina (petrol went up from $2.60 
to $3.00 per gallon) implies that their disposable income available for other spending and saving has been reduced by 
0.8% during the price spike. Real consumer spending is therefore likely to have received a dent in September 
although part of the effect probably has been absorbed by a further drop in the already negative personal saving rate. 
The inflation rate for September will receive a significant push upwards. 
 
Lower consumer confidence: The two most prominent indicators for consumer confidence dropped sharply in 
September. The Conference Board’s index fell by 19 points from 105.6 in August to 86.6 in September, the third-
largest setback on record. Although a partial rebound in confidence is widely expected for October, it cannot be 
excluded that, as a consequence, consumer spending growth will be curbed for a while.  
 
Rebuilding: GDP growth will receive a “second round” boost when rebuilding of damaged homes and 
infrastructure takes off. Rebuilding worth $50 billion in 2006 (half of the currently estimated damage) would directly 
add 0.4 percentage points to growth. To this one could add multiplier effects. 
 
Higher public spending: So far the Administration has requested, and Congress has approved, $62.3 billion for 
relief and clean-up after Katrina. More public funding for reconstruction has been announced. By most estimates, 
hurricane-related public spending could total $200 billion, or 1.6% of current annual GDP. Although the 
appropriations are likely to be spent over several years, the main part will probably fall into fiscal year 2006. The 
worsening budget outlook may put upward pressure on interest rates. On 20 September the Federal Open Market 
Committee continued its gradual withdrawal of monetary policy accommodation by raising the federal funds target 
rate to 3.75% in spite of the Katrina-induced uncertainty for the economic outlook. Although longer-term interest 
rates fell in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, they had more than recouped this decline by the end of September. 
A trend towards higher interest rates would counteract the expansionary effect of publicly financed hurricane relief. 
  
growth in the third quarter, but the main effect 
will be on the fourth-quarter growth rate, which 
may be lowered by 1 percentage point 
(annualised) according to first estimates. On the 
other hand, the clean-up and rebuilding of the 
hurricane-affected area should raise GDP growth 
next year and restore the level of output relatively 
quickly.  
The labour market has continued to improve 
with non-farm payrolls growing at an average 
annual rate of 1¾% since the beginning of the 
year and the unemployment rate drifting down to 
4.9% in August. But the absence of any wage 
acceleration seems to indicate that there is not 
yet any real labour market tightness. Labour 
productivity growth has slowed to 2.2% year-on-
year in the non-farm business sector in the 
second quarter, down from 4.2% one year earlier. 
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Rising energy prices have pushed CPI inflation to 
3.6% y-o-y in August, up from 3.0% at the 
beginning of the year, while core inflation has 
remained relatively subdued at 2.1% 
The Japanese economy is emerging from the 
soft patch registered at the end of 2004. GDP 
grew by 3.3% at an annualised rate in the second 
quarter of 2005, following growth of 5.4% in the 
previous quarter. While there was a noticeable 
slowdown in exports (particularly to Asia), the 
recovery was mainly fuelled by a rebound in 
domestic demand. Private consumption 
improved in the first half of 2005. Indicators of 
consumer confidence continue to be favourable 
on the whole. Household income has been rising 
moderately as a result of an improving 
employment situation and the interruption of the 
decline in real wages. Moreover, bank lending 
rose in August for the first time since 1998, 
giving more evidence of the recovery in the 
domestic economy. Non-residential investment 
was also a significant contributor to GDP growth 
in the first half of the year. The June Tankan 
survey showed an increase in business 
confidence across all sectors.  
Deflationary pressures are continuing to ease, 
albeit slowly. In July, the headline CPI decreased 
by 0.3% year-on-year, while the core index fell by 
0.2%, despite the narrowing of the output gap. 
The end of asset price deflation also seems on 
track, with signs of increasing land prices in some 
regions. The Bank of Japan has committed itself 
to maintaining the current monetary policy 
framework of quantitative easing in place until 
deflation has been brought to a definite end.  
Looking ahead, the Japanese economy is 
expected to continue to expand moderately in 
the coming quarters, with the global economic 
environment remaining supportive of GDP 
growth and domestic demand maintaining its 
current momentum. The re-election of Prime 
Minister Koizumi should boost structural 
reforms and probably increase household and 
business confidence.  
Economic growth in China continued to be very 
strong in the first half of 2005, growing by 9.4% 
and 9.5% year-on-year in the first and second 
quarter respectively. The contribution from net 
exports increased, as export growth remained 
very strong and import growth decelerated due 
to some moderation of investment and an 
increase in the supply of some domestic import 
substitutes. As a result, the trade balance 
strengthened further, with the trade surplus in 
the first half of 2005 already exceeding its level 
for 2004 as a whole. Notwithstanding higher raw 
material and energy costs, inflation continued to 
show a downward trend in the first half of 2005, 
falling to 1.6% year-on-year in June from 3.9% 
year-on-year on average last year. Growth is 
projected to slow down somewhat during the 
remainder of 2005, averaging about 9% in the 
year as a whole.  
On 21 July 2005, the People’s Bank of China 
announced that, following a 2.1% revaluation of 
the Renminbi (RMB), it would replace the 11-
year long peg against the US dollar with a 
managed floating exchange-rate regime, based on 
market supply and demand with reference to a 
basket of currencies. The exact composition of 
the basket remains undisclosed.  
Growth momentum in the rest of Asia 
decelerated in the first half of 2005, due to 
slower external demand. However, in the second 
half of 2005, the region should experience some 
acceleration in growth, as the IT sector gradually 
turns upward and domestic demand strengthens. 
Growth also slowed in Latin America in the 
first half of the year, as a tighter monetary policy 
took its toll on domestic demand. With 
continued robust global growth, high commodity 
prices and favourable financing conditions, 
however, growth is expected to remain resilient. 
The rising price of oil should sustain growth in 
oil-exporting countries, such as those in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and 
the Middle East.  
Oil prices push up headline inflation, but 
underlying prices pressures are contained  
Inflation has edged up in the euro area in the 
past few months. Annual HICP inflation rose 
from 2.0% in May to 2.2% in July and August 
and Eurostat’s latest Flash estimate shows a 
further increase to 2.5% in September. These 
developments mostly reflect the impact of higher 
oil prices. In August, the energy component of 
the HICP (which represents 8.6% of the 
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indicator’s consumption basket) was close to 
12% higher than a year earlier. In contrast, core 
inflation as measured by the HICP excluding 
energy and unprocessed foods, has remained 
unchanged at 1.4% since June. There are some 
signs that the rise in oil prices is progressively 
feeding through into other components of the 
HICP, with inflation picking up in particular in 
the transport sector. However, these indirect 
effects remain contained and have been offset by 
a drop in prices in other consumption categories 
such as clothing and recreational services.  
Graph 9: Inflation in the euro area  
 (y-o-y change in % – Jan 2001 to Sep 2005 (1)) 
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(1) September data are only available for total HICP (Eurostat Flash 
estimate).  
Source: Commission services. 
In the coming months, inflation in the euro area 
is expected to remain above 2% due to recent oil 
price developments. However, there is no 
evidence of underlying inflationary pressures 
building up in the euro-area economy. 
Inflationary pressures from the labour market 
remain subdued with no signs so far of second-
round effects from higher oil prices. Growth in 
compensation per employee as derived from 
quarterly national accounts increased slightly in 
the first quarter of the year (most recent available 
data). However, other data available for the 
second quarter such as the ECB’s indicator of 
negotiated wages and Eurostat’s hourly labour 
cost index suggest that the pick-up was short-
lived. In addition, price expectations remain fairly 
contained. Inflation expectations as derived from 
inflation-indexed bonds have stayed on a broad 
downward trend since the beginning of the year. 
Price expectations derived from consumer 
surveys have increased since the beginning of the 
year but remain well below the peaks reached 
during the spike in oil prices of 1999-2000.  
Monetary and financial conditions 
Monetary and financial conditions in the euro 
area have remained accommodative over the last 
few months. Although the depreciation of the 
euro observed since the beginning of the year has 
come to a halt since July, monetary conditions as 
measured by the Monetary Conditions Index 
(MCI) are still accommodative. Meanwhile, long-
term financial conditions have improved further 
on the back of rising equity and bond prices. 
Regarding short-term interest rates, earlier 
market expectations about a possible ECB cut 
dissolved between the two rate-setting meetings 
of the Governing Council in July and August. 
Since the last rate-setting meeting of the ECB 
Governing Council in early September, most 
commercial banks expect the ECB to keep its 
policy rates on hold until the second half of 
2006. Futures contracts have priced in more than 
a full 25 basis points rate hike by the ECB before 
end-2006. 
Graph 10: Euro-area monetary conditions 
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Source: Commission services. 
In the USA, the Federal Reserve Board has raised 
interest rates by 275 basis points since 30 June 
2004, bringing the target for the federal funds 
rate to 3.75 percent. After the last FOMC 
meeting in September, the Fed took some in the 
market by surprise when it said in its post-
meeting statement that economic disruptions 
triggered by Hurricane Katrina did not pose a 
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lasting threat and that it remained vigilant about 
the risks of inflation. Earlier, Hurricane Katrina 
had evoked some doubts about the timing of 
future Fed hikes.  
Graph 11: 3-month Euribor future implied rates (LIFE) 
(in %) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Buoyancy in equity markets was the main driver 
of government bond yields in July and the 
beginning of August. The healthy corporate 
earnings season fuelled equity prices, making 
bond prices somewhat less attractive. The slight 
rise in bond yields seemed also to have been 
supported by the change in the currency regime 
in China (which could lead to lower purchases of 
US bonds by the Chinese Central Bank) and 
better than expected economic data in the euro 
area and the USA. However, when the recent oil 
price hike took centre stage in the middle of 
August, European and US bond markets rallied 
again, bringing government bond yields back 
down to their pre-summer lows. This drop in 
bond yields was also driven by mixed confidence 
indicators. In the days before the last FOMC 
meeting, US bond yields started to climb up, 
giving higher probability to a Fed rate hike. This 
trend continued throughout September and US 
bond yields stood at 4.31 percent on 30 
September (see also Section 2 for further analysis 
of recent developments in bond and equity 
markets). 
In the euro area, 10-year government bond yields 
reached a new record low of 3.04 percent on 
5 September and stood at 3.14 percent on 
30 September. As a result of different 
expectations about inflation and growth 
developments in the US and the euro area and 
consequently about the future paths of monetary 
policy in the two regions, the yield differential 
between US and euro-area government bonds 
increased from around 100 basis points in 
August to almost 120 basis points in September. 
Graph 12: Yield curve (10-year minus 3-month interbank) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The flattening of the yield curve, in particular in 
the USA, has raised financial markets’ attention 
in recent weeks. While many analysts interpreted 
a flattening yield curve as a sure sign of an 
economic slowdown, Fed chairman Greenspan 
expressed some scepticism backed by the last 
flattening episode in the second half of the 
1990s. At that time, the spread between long- 
and short-term interest rates narrowed by almost 
400 basis points, while growth averaged around 
4 percent. 
Stock markets in the euro area continued this 
year’s rally and seemed to have experienced only 
a temporary shift in sentiment when they slightly 
dropped at the end of August driven by the 
increase in oil prices. The decline in confidence 
indicators in the USA contributed to the 
perception that high oil prices had started 
impacting US consumers and might cause a soft 
patch in global economies. Since the beginning 
of September, stock markets have rallied again, 
reaching their early-August levels. On 
30 September, the EuroStoxx was more than 
20 percent above its 2004 average. The surprising 
resilience of equity markets is still in contrast to 
bond market expectations according to which 
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global economic growth would be mainly 
negatively impacted by the increasing oil prices.  
Graph 13: Nominal effective and bilateral USD/EUR 
exchange rate  
(1/Jan/03=100 – 1 Jan 2003 to 30 Sep 2005) 
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Source: Commission services. 
This year’s downward trend of the euro exchange 
rate reversed in July, when the euro slowly 
started to appreciate. The trend accelerated when 
markets started to expect some discontinuation 
of the Fed’s interest rate hikes and the dollar-
euro-exchange rate moved close to 
1.26 USD/EUR early September. In the wake of 
inconclusive German election results and 
increased market expectations about future Fed 
rate hikes after the last FOMC meeting, the euro 
lost its earlier gains during the course of 
September. On 30 September, the dollar-euro 
exchange rate stood at 1.20 USD/EUR, only 
slightly above this year’s low of 1.18 USD/EUR 
and slightly below last year’s average. 
2. Recent financial market developments 
Bond yields decline to historically low levels  
Following a brief up-tick at the beginning of 
2005, euro-area benchmark bond yields have 
resumed a downward trend, reaching new 
historical lows in September. With yields at the 
shorter end of the curve underpinned by 
unchanged ECB policy rates, there has been a 
flattening in the euro yield curve. Nevertheless, 
the curve remains clearly upward sloping, with 
the two-year/ten-year spread currently at about 
77 basis points at the end of September. The 
trend in euro-area yields has been broadly in line 
with developments in the United States. While 
the evolution in the euro-area yield curve can be 
linked to moderate inflation expectations in 
conditions of sluggish economic growth, 
developments in the US curve are more difficult 
to explain in terms of economic fundamentals. 
US ten-year benchmark yields have remained 
close to historical lows, despite a marked 
strengthening in the domestic economy and 
some evidence of inflation pressure. A gradual 
but sustained tightening in monetary policy by 
the Federal Reserve since June 2004 has been 
accompanied by a notable flattening in the yield 
curve, and the two-year/ten-year spread declined 
to only 16 basis points at the end of September. 
Graph 14: Evolution of euro area and US benchmark 
yield (in % – 1 Jan 2002 to 30 Sep 2005) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
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Risk premiums tightly compressed  
Within the euro area, the spreads between 
national benchmark yields remain tightly 
compressed and have been only moderately 
affected by EU-specific factors such as breaches 
of the Stability and Growth Pact and difficulties 
in ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. So far, 
these factors have weighed more on the euro 
exchange rate than on the bond market. There 
has, however, been a limited widening in yield 
spreads in Italy, Greece and Portugal, where the 
rating of government debt has recently been 
downgraded.  
In the corporate bond market, risk premiums 
have fallen to historical lows in all risk segments 
(Graph 15). This phenomenon is also evident in 
US markets (as well as in emerging-market debt) 
and has been attributed to a range of factors, 
notably (a) improvements in the creditworthiness 
of companies, amid efforts to reduce costs and 
restructure balance sheets, (b) a generalised 
decline in risk aversion amid ample global 
liquidity and (c) a perceived switch in portfolio 
preferences among institutional investors from 
equities to fixed-income securities.  
Graph 15: Euro area corporate bond spreads (1) 
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(1) Based on MCI Euro Credit spreads in basis points.  
Source: EcoWin. 
There was a temporary correction in risk 
premiums in mid-April linked to the high-profile 
downgrading of issuers in the US automobile 
sector to below investment grade. This mainly 
impacted the higher-risk segments of the market 
but, by mid-May, risk premiums were again 
declining rapidly and are now only marginally 
above their level at the beginning of 2005. The 
episode demonstrates the recent resilience of 
lenders to negative events. By implication, access 
to direct financing has been facilitated even for 
those companies which would typically 
experience difficulty in tapping the corporate 
bond market.  
Steady issuance in most market segments, 
except the corporate sector 
Reflecting favourable issuing conditions, the 
(gross) volume of bond issuance in euro has been 
steady in 2005. Central governments remain the 
dominant issuers, although financial institutions 
have also been very active in the market 
(Graph 16). By contrast, the supply of corporate 
bonds remains subdued despite a receptive 
market even for low-rated issues.
6
 Given that 
restructuring is fairly advanced, the weakness in 
corporate bond issuance is likely to reflect low 
levels of investment. The limited supply of 
corporate debt to the market has created 
conditions of excess demand, particularly among 
institutional investors in search of higher yielding 
fixed-income assets. As a result, there has been a 
significant increase in the use of structured 
products (i.e. derivatives linked to underlying 
corporate bonds) by these investors.
 
  
Graph 16: Gross issuance of euro-denominated bonds 
by type of issuer (Jan 2004 to Aug 2005, in bn euro) 
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Source: Commission services. 
                                                     
6
  A spike in corporate issuance in June was an aberration in 
trend and reflected the bringing forward of issuance plans 
ahead of the 1 July deadline for  implementing the EU 
Directive on Prospectuses. As the Directive will require 
an updating of borrowing programmes, many issuers 
opted to bring forward their planned borrowing. 
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A robust pick-up in equity prices 
The rising trend in euro-area equity prices, which 
began in the second half of 2004, has accelerated 
in the course of 2005. Prices stalled temporarily 
in April (amid disappointing earnings results in 
some large US companies and weaker-than-
expected macroeconomic data) and more 
recently in August (on concerns about the 
implications of high oil prices), but have quickly 
resumed their upward trend. So far this year, 
equity markets in the euro-area and Japan have 
tended to outperform the US market. End-
September, the EuroStoxx index was 15 percent 
higher, compared to a rise of 18 percent in the 
Nikkei and a largely unchanged DJIA 
(Graph 17).  
Graph 17: Performance of the main global equity 
markets  
(indices 100 = 1 Jan 2005 – 1 Jan 2005 to 30 Sep 2005) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
A slower pick-up in equity issuance 
Equity issuance in the euro area, which has been 
largely absent since the major market correction 
in 2000, picked up slightly in the first half of 
2005. As in the corporate bond market, at least 
part of the increase in equity issuance can be 
attributed to the approaching deadline for the 
EU Directive on Prospectuses. Although the 
bulk of EU issuance activity was located on AIM 
(London’s smaller companies market), there was 
more limited activity in euro-area markets such as 
Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Belgium. 
However, in parallel with the recovery in 
issuance activity, there were further de-listings 
from exchanges, mainly as a consequence of 
restructuring in international companies. 
Diversity in market performances across 
countries and sectors 
There has been considerable diversity in the 
performance of national equity markets within 
the euro area (Graph 18). The Austrian equity 
market has been the strongest performer, 
reflecting its economic links with the faster-
growing economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as the privatisation of state-
owned companies and implementation of 
economic reforms. Among the other relatively 
strong markets are France (led by the robust 
performance by the oil company Total), Spain 
(reflecting a relatively high rate of economic 
growth and its exposure to rapidly growing Latin 
American economies) and Germany (supported 
by strong corporate earnings, low initial 
valuations and an anticipated positive effect of 
the recent euro depreciation on the export 
sector).  
Graph 18: Euro-area equity indices 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Some diversity is also evident across sectors. The 
oil and gas sector (and other commodity-linked 
sectors) recorded sharp price increases, while the 
retail sector remained flat (Graph 19). Otherwise, 
prices in most sectors have moved within a 
broadly similar range, except for the poor 
performance of telecommunications and the 
rather erratic performance of the technology 
sector. 
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Graph 19: EU sectoral equity indices  
(indices 100 = 1 Jan 2005 – 1 Jan 2005 – to 30 Sep 2005) 
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05
Oil & Gas
Financial services
Industrial goods and services
Technology
Telecommunications
Retail
 
Source: EcoWin. 
Mixed signals from bond and equity markets  
Typically, bond and equity prices are negatively 
correlated. The expectations of higher economic 
growth, which underlie rising equity prices, tend 
to be associated with expectations of higher 
inflation, which depress bond prices – vice versa. 
Accordingly, the current market environment in 
which the prices of both bonds and equities have 
been rising simultaneously could imply a possible 
divergence in expectations of growth and 
inflation among investors in bonds and equities, 
respectively. However, an alternative explanation 
for this positive correlation is that both markets 
are being driven mainly by factors other than the 
economic cycle.  
Among the non-cyclical factors which have been 
cited to explain historically high bond prices, not 
only in the euro area but more globally are 
(a) increased credibility of monetary policy to 
deliver sustained low inflation even in conditions 
of strong economic growth; (b) the continued 
ample supply of global liquidity which is fuelling 
an investor search for yield; (c) structural demand 
for longer-dated sovereign debt among 
institutional investors, as well as among Asian 
central banks; and (d) net savings in the US 
corporate sector.
7
 Similar non-cyclical factors 
may be playing a role in driving equity prices 
higher. In line with global trends, the level of 
                                                     
7
  While saving in the overall economy (including 
households and government) remains very low, net 
corporate saving has pushed down corporate interest 
rates by depressing spreads.  
implied volatility
8
 in euro-area equities remains 
well below historical averages, despite short-lived 
increases in mid-April (due to concern about US 
economic prospects) and in mid-July (in response 
to the terrorist attack in London). Low volatility 
is associated with the reduced risk aversion of 
equity investors in search of yield, particularly in 
a context of low-yielding bond markets.  
Graph 20: Implied volatility on main euro area and US 
equity indices (1 Jan 1999 to 30 Sep 2005) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Other factors, which may explain the specific 
buoyancy of euro-area equity markets –
particularly in a context of sustained low 
economic growth and consumer demand – 
include (i) the improved profitability and – more 
importantly - expected profitability of EU 
companies
9
 due to cost-cutting; (ii) the use of 
expanding corporate cash balances to pay 
dividends or to buy back shares; and (iii) an 
acceleration in merger and acquisition activity. 
Moreover, the price-earnings ratio of 14.5 for 
EU equities is well below 20 for US equities, and  
may be attracting investors in search of higher 
returns.
10
 
                                                     
8
  Implied volatility is the estimated volatility of a security’s 
price and is calculated from option prices. 
9
  It is generally considered that companies have more 
leeway for further cost-cutting and productivity increase 
in the EU than in the US where unit labour costs are 
rising. 
10
  European equities have historically traded at a discount to 
US equities. Though they are not at their most attractive 
level compared to US equities over the last ten years 
(December 2001), they are currently at a discount 
significantly above the historical average.  
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Is the current situation sustainable? 
The current trends in euro-area bond and equity 
markets are generally favourable, but significant 
risks remain. The main risk relates to a possibly 
abrupt reversal in investor expectations of 
economic growth and inflation. While non-
cyclical factors may be at play in driving both 
markets, the current level of prices suggests that 
a strong economic recovery and a sustained low 
inflation rate are both fully discounted. The 
concern must be that, after many years of ample 
liquidity and investor search for yield, asset 
valuations have been stretched to a point that 
investor risk is being mis-priced. If so, these 
markets – bond markets in particular – could be 
vulnerable to disturbance if expected growth 
and/or inflation rates were not to materialise. 
Any such correction would take place against a 
background of major imbalances in the 
international financial system, which have long 
raised the spectre of a disorderly adjustment in 
exchange rates (see the focus section on global 
imbalances in this issue). 
Such a correction in asset prices and exchange 
rates could create a vicious circle by aggravating 
problems in the real economy via a deterioration 
in the balance sheets of households, companies 
and financial intermediaries. There could also be 
possible implications for financial stability, if the 
deterioration in corporate and household balance 
sheets was sufficient to significantly diminish the 
creditworthiness of bank clients (see Section 3 on 
the financial health of the private sector below). 
In considering the likelihood of such a scenario, 
attention is inevitably drawn to high oil prices as 
a possible trigger. Financial markets have reacted 
calmly to the very sharp and sustained rise in oil 
prices so far this year. This muted reaction can 
be attributed to the fact that cost pressures from 
higher energy prices have not been reflected 
either in the pace of global economic activity or 
in core CPI inflation. There are also indications 
that the credit cycle is turning and that the 
corporate sector – particularly in the United 
States – may soon return to a position of 
significant net borrowing. Both these 
developments would point to upward pressure 
on expected yields and credit risk premiums in 
the future.  
3. The financial health of the private 
sector in the euro area 
In assessing conditions in the EU non-financial 
private sector the main question to be addressed 
is whether the financing opportunities and costs 
facing the corporate and household sectors 
remain supportive of economic growth. More 
specific questions to be addressed are (a) whether 
the phase of subdued net demand for external 
funding in the corporate sector since 2001 is now 
coming to an end, thereby presaging a recovery 
in investment spending; and (b) whether the 
accumulation of household debt associated with 
housing market booms in some Member States 
poses a threat to economic performance and, 
possibly also to financial stability.  
Financing conditions and costs 
Financing conditions and costs, which were 
already favourable one year ago, have improved 
further for both non-financial corporations and 
households in the euro area. Interest rates on 
both bank lending and direct financing remain at 
very low levels, both in nominal and real terms.
11
 
Interest rates on bank lending, which is still the 
predominant source of external funding for both 
sectors, have declined steadily since 2003 and 
have remained at very low levels in recent 
months. The decline in interest rates has been 
pronounced in respect of corporate and 
mortgage lending, while rates for consumer 
credit retreated more modestly (Graph 21).  
Further evidence of increasingly favourable 
financing conditions can be derived from the 
ECB bank lending survey, which shows a 
continuous amelioration in the terms of credit 
conditions for both the corporate sector and 
households. More recently, however, the banks’ 
credit stance toward the two sectors has begun to 
diverge, continuing to ease in respect of 
companies but reverting toward neutral for 
households (Graph 22). 
                                                     
11
  In the context of this note, the term bank is used for 
Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs).  
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Graph 21: Bank interest rates for the non-financial 
private sector, euro area (in % –  2003 to 2005) (1) 
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(1) Rates refer to over 5 year loan interest rates for all but lending 
for house purchase, where the category “over 5 years and up to 10 
years” was selected. 
Source: ECB. 
 
Graph 22: Evolution of banks’ credit stance towards the 
non-financial private sector, euro area (1) 
(2003Q1 to 2005Q3) 
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(1) Values below (above) 0 signify a net easing (tightening). 
Source: ECB bank lending survey. 
Investor demand for corporate debt has been 
high and rising in recent years, providing 
companies with expanded opportunities for 
direct financing. As demand has grown, 
corporate bond yields have been on a downward 
trend across the different risk categories and 
have moved to new lows in recent months, amid 
historically low risk-free rates and a continued 
narrowing in credit-risk spreads. A notable 
development in this context has been the 
relatively pronounced decline in yields for both 
longer-term and higher-risk issues. 
In addition, euro-area equity prices have been on 
a sustained upward trend in 2005. However, 
evidence suggests that companies have yet to 
return to equity issuance as a major external 
funding option.  
Balance-sheet conditions and financing 
demand  
While financing conditions and costs remain 
favourable for both the corporate sector and the 
household sector, the demand for external 
funding is equally determined by the condition of 
sectoral balance sheets. In a context of high 
accumulated liabilities, companies and 
households may choose to take advantage of 
favourable financing conditions to consolidate 
their balance sheets via re-financing rather than 
embarking on new expenditure plans. If so, low 
interest rates may not be reflected – as much as 
would typically be expected – in an increase in 
economic activity. Such considerations seem 
relevant in explaining the rather different 
performance of the corporate and household 
sectors in the euro area since the late 1990s. 
(i) Non-financial corporate sector 
The favourable overall financing conditions, 
which have prevailed for several years, appear to 
have had little impact on the investment activity 
of the euro-area corporate sector, with net 
borrowing of the sector gradually declining since 
2000 to about 1% of GDP in 2004 (Graph 23). 
This apparent failure to respond to lower interest 
rates and improved financing opportunities can 
be explained as a reaction to the very sharp 
increases in net funding recorded between 1999 
and 2001. These increases in net funding gave 
rise to accumulated debt liabilities, which became 
progressively unsustainable as the global 
economy slowed in the aftermath of the 2000 
stock market correction.  
Thus, for much of the period since 2002, 
companies have been engaged in balance-sheet 
restructuring, benefiting from low interest rates 
to re-finance existing debt while simultaneously 
limiting their investment activity. In response to 
these consolidation measures, the level of 
accumulated corporate debt has stabilised at 
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about 62% of GDP since 2002 (Graph 24). 
However, this stabilisation of gross indebtedness 
does not necessarily indicate an end to the 
process of consolidation 
Graph 23: Net financial position of non-financial 
corporations, euro area (1) (in % of GDP – 1996 to 2004)  
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(1) Financial accounts data. 
Source: Eurostat, Deutsche Bundesbank, own estimations. 
 
Graph 24: Ratio of debt to GDP in non-financial 
corporations, euro area (in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q1)  
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Source: ECB, own calculations. 
Further evidence of  balance-sheet restructuring 
can be found in companies’ progress in locking 
in low longer-term interest rates, leading to an 
ongoing replacement of short-term debt since 
2001 (Graph 25).  
Companies have also been able to reduce net 
interest payments to the banking sector to 
slightly over 1.5% of GDP in Q1 2005 
(Graph 26). Mirroring the fall in interest 
payments, the year-on-year growth rate of non-
financial corporate deposits at banks is 
continuously outpacing the corresponding 
growth of bank loans to the sector in recent years 
(Graph 26). While the available evidence would 
suggest that the restructuring of companies’ 
balance sheets is now advanced, net growth in 
demand for external funding has remained low 
and there is evidence of an important 
accumulation of cash balances within the 
corporate sector. The counterpart of these 
various balance-sheet developments has been the 
continued weakness of investment activity in the 
euro area. 
Graph 25: Ratio of non-financial corporate long-term 
debt to total debt, euro area (1998Q1 to 2005Q2) 
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Source: ECB, own calculations. 
More recently, however, there have been the first 
signs of a pick-up in companies’ external funding 
demand and the gap in the growth rates between 
corporate deposits at banks and corresponding 
bank loans has narrowed since 2004. In addition, 
the most recent ECB bank lending survey 
predicts higher loan demand from non-financial 
corporations later this year. On the basis of this – 
admittedly partial – evidence, one might 
tentatively conclude that the weak trend in 
external funding demand has bottomed, with 
positive implications for investment activity 
going forward. However, the fragility of the 
current recovery in external funding demand 
means that any negative shock to domestic or 
global demand in the coming quarters and/or a 
sharper-than-expected pick-up in inflation and 
interest rates would be a cause for concern, 
insofar as the recent improvement in corporate 
creditworthiness might not be sustained – in 
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which case, further repair of balance sheets might 
be deemed necessary, with detrimental 
implications for corporate spending on 
investment. 
Graph 26: Bank loans to and deposits from 
corporations, euro area, (growth rate in %) and net 
interest payments of the corporate sector to banks, euro 
area (in % of GDP – 1999Q1 to 2005Q2) 
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Source: ECB, own calculations. 
 
Graph 27: Net lending to other sectors by households 
(in % of GDP – 1996 to 2004) (1) 
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(1) Financial accounts data based on individual euro-area Member 
States. 
Source: Eurostat, Deutsche Bundesbank, own estimations. 
(ii) Household sector 
In contrast to the non-financial corporate sector, 
euro-area households have responded to 
favourable financing conditions by accumulating 
additional debt in recent years. The household 
sector remains a net lender in the economy, but 
with a diminished net financial surplus when 
compared to previous periods. Net lending to 
other sectors has progressively diminished from 
over 5% in 2002 to below 4% of GDP in 2004 
and bank lending to households has picked up 
progressively since the beginning of 2003 
(Graph 27). 
Graph 28: Bank loans to households, euro area 
(y-o-y growth rate in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q2) 
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Source: ECB, own calculations. 
Bank credit growth has accelerated to an annual 
rate of 8% in the first two quarters of 2005, with 
provisional figures for July indicating a 
continuation of that trend. The pick-up in the 
growth rate of consumer loans has been 
especially pronounced, accelerating from an 
annual rate of 2% at the end of 2003 to over 7% 
at the beginning of 2005. 
Although starting from a higher rate of growth, 
mortgage lending has also accelerated to an 
annual 10% in the first half of 2005 (Graph 28). 
The financial outlook for the household sector is 
far from clear. While a positive wealth effect 
might be expected from the recent further rise in 
asset prices, increased mortgage liabilities and 
surging oil prices are a cause for concern. In 
recent years, household debt ratios have soared, 
with accumulated debt up from about 45% of 
GDP in 1999 to about 56% in 2005 and from 
70% to 82% of disposable income over the same 
period (Graph 29). 
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Graph 29: Household debt as a share of GDP and of 
disposable income, euro area (1) 
(in % – 1999Q1 to 2005Q1)  
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(1) Quarterly disposable income data are based on estimations. 
Source: ECB, Eurostat, own estimations. 
 
Graph 30: Components of banks’ loans to households, 
euro area, 2005 
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Source: ECB, own calculations. 
Although the bulk of these liabilities are secured 
against real estate, the rise in household debt 
ratios and the increased exposure of banks to 
mortgage lending (i.e. currently about 68% of 
total bank loans to households – see Graph 30) is 
a source of concern in respect of both economic 
performance and financial stability. While a very 
sharp rise in interest rates would be necessary to 
trigger a correction in house prices on a scale that 
could threaten financial stability, a relatively small 
rise in rates (possibly due to the surge in oil 
prices) could have implications for household 
balance sheets, notably in countries with a high 
proportion of variable-rate borrowing. 
The negative effect of higher interest rates on 
house prices would be greatly amplified, if 
accompanied by a rise in unemployment. On the 
other hand, while the higher debt accumulated by 
households in some Member States has certainly 
increased their vulnerability to shocks, the 
structure of housing and mortgage markets in 
most of the euro-area Member States is thought 
to be less conducive to wealth effects than those 
in the United Kingdom or the United States. 
(iii) Financial sector  
The financial position of EU banks continued to 
improve in 2004 and the first half of 2005, with 
most large EU banks posting strong earnings 
growth, higher profitability and sound prudential 
ratios. Though performance has varied 
somewhat across the Member States, both 
profitability and solvency measures improved 
even among the banks with a weaker 
performance. 
The main drivers of this favourable performance 
have been (i) increased revenues from retail 
business, where robust demand for household 
credit has more than offset the impact of intense 
competition in narrowing interest margins; 
(ii) sustained growth in non-interest income from 
recovering equity markets and revived interest in 
mutual funds and other savings products; 
(iii) continued efficiency improvements due to 
cost-cutting and restructuring measures 
undertaken in recent years, and (iv) a substantial 
drop in loan-loss provisions, reflecting an 
improvement in asset quality due to a 
strengthening performance in the corporate 
sector and in emerging-market economies.  
Market indicators reflected the favourable 
situation of EU banks, with the banking sector 
equity index out-performing the total market in 
the second half of 2004, positive rating changes, 
and distance-to-default indicators which 
continued to increase from an already high 
level.
12
 Despite this generally favourable 
situation, several potential risks can be identified. 
The prospects of further increases in profitability 
in the course of 2005 could be dampened by 
                                                     
12
  Since the beginning of 2005, however, banking sector 
equity indices have been under-performing the total 
market, but this has been due mainly to the oil sector’s 
strong performance. 
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slower-than-expected economic growth, and 
particularly a decline in demand for retail 
services. With  respect to lending behaviour, an 
increased exposure to real estate markets is 
notable, while credit standards for house loans 
appear to have been loosened somewhat (e.g. 
loan-to-value ratios on new mortgages seem to 
have significantly increased). Meanwhile, credit-
risk premiums on bank loans to companies may 
well have been unjustifiably compressed by the 
development of a corporate bond market in the 
euro area. Overall, however, EU banks display 
robust capital and solvency ratios and should be 
in a position to weather adverse developments. 
Graph 31: Relative performance of the EU banking 
sector index (1 July 2004 to 30 Sept 2005) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
Non-bank financial intermediaries also continued 
to improve their performance in 2004 and the 
first half of 2005. Several of the biggest EU 
insurance companies have posted strong positive 
interim results for 2004 and the first half of 2005. 
Overall, the insurance sector appears to be 
adequately capitalised. However, some concerns 
remain about the sector’s increased exposure to 
risk, and Hurricane Katrina could put some 
pressure on reinsurers’ financial situation. 
Similarly, the funding levels of EU pension funds 
have further recovered in the course of 2004 and 
the first half of 2005. 
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Focus 
II. Global current account imbalances and the euro area 
Global current account imbalances have dominated discussions among policy-makers already for a number of years. The most 
important imbalances concern the large and rising current account deficit of the United States and the matching surplus of 
East Asia and the Middle East, while the current account for the euro area is roughly balanced. Nevertheless, the euro area 
would likely be substantially impacted by any disorderly unwinding of the global imbalances. Different scenarios show that the 
euro area could suffer from substantial current account and output losses, if the adjustment involves a sharp depreciation of the 
dollar and a recession in the United States. On the other hand the impact would be mitigated if East Asia were to increase 
its imports. The euro area on its own can make only a limited contribution to reducing global imbalances, primarily because 
its own starting position is balanced. Even a sizable increase in the euro-area’s trend output growth would not result in 
substantial and lasting improvements in the US external balance. However, the euro area can prepare itself to better absorb 
the shock that any disorderly unwinding would bring by implementing structural reforms that improve the flexibility and 
resilience of its constituent economies. 
Increased global financial integration makes it 
easier for countries to run large current account 
imbalances than in the past. Recent years have 
seen the build-up of large current account 
deficits in the United States, which are matched 
by an increasing current account surplus in 
particular in East Asia and the Middle East. 
However, the unprecedented scale of these 
imbalances has led to fears that their eventual 
correction could give rise to disruptive exchange 
rate realignments, with significant global 
implications.  
Graph 32: Current account balances 
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Source: IMF. 
In sharp contrast to the United States and its 
East Asian and Middle Eastern lenders, the euro 
area has a roughly balanced current account. 
Nevertheless it could find itself at the heart of 
the economic disruption caused by a possible 
disorderly correction of global imbalances. This 
focus examines these issues as follows: the first 
section takes stock of the recent developments in 
global current account imbalances; the second 
section discusses possible ways in which the 
these imbalances could be corrected through 
adjustments in the United States or Asia; a third 
section considers what, if anything, the euro area 
could do to reduce the global imbalances; and a 
final section concludes, stressing the need for the 
euro area to implement economic reforms to 
brace itself for the possibility of a disorderly 
unwinding of the global imbalances.  
1. Global imbalances 
US current account deficit 
The US current account deficit is the focal point 
of the concerns about global imbalances. In 
2004, the US deficit rose to nearly 670bn US 
dollars (5.7 percent of GDP – Graph 32).
13
 This 
represents around 1.6 percent of world GDP. 
This is significantly higher than the US external 
deficits of the 1980s, which never rose above 3.5 
percent of US GDP and 1 percent of world 
GDP, values which the US has now exceeded for 
six years in a row. The US current account deficit 
is unprecedented in its magnitude and duration 
for an industrialised country. The USA is now 
absorbing around 70 percent of the net capital 
outflows of all countries running current account 
                                                     
13
 The IMF’s World Economic Outlook September 2005 
provides an in-depth analysis of global savings and 
investment trends. 
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surpluses, despite an already significant fall in the 
value of the US dollar since 2001.  
The external imbalances reflect domestic 
imbalances in the US economy (Graph 33). 
While investment rates have not changed much 
over the last ten years, the savings rate has 
declined sharply since the late 1990s. US 
households have reduced their personal saving as 
a percentage of disposable income, from 7% at 
the beginning of the 1990s to a mere 1% in 2004. 
Over the last five years there has also been an 
important deterioration in public finances, which 
went from a surplus of 1.3% of GDP in 2000 to 
a deficit of 4.3% of GDP in 2004. The resulting 
savings–investment gap was filled by a 
substantial capital inflow into the USA. The late 
1990s witnessed a surge of private equity inflows 
connected with the ICT boom. After the ICT 
bubble burst, private capital flows diminished 
substantially. Instead foreign central banks 
started to buy ever-increasing volumes of dollar-
denominated bonds, thus financing both the US 
current account and the US budget deficit. 
Graph 33: United States internal and external balance 
(% of GDP – 1991 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Surplus in East Asia and the Middle East 
The counterbalancing improvement in the 
current accounts accrued mostly in East Asia and 
the Middle East. Other countries, such as Japan, 
retained a positive but relatively unchanged 
current account balance. The Middle Eastern 
current account surplus is explained mostly by 
windfalls from high oil prices. The dominating 
factor in East Asia is the central banks which 
have accumulated huge dollar reserves in recent 
years through interventions aimed at stabilising 
their exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, thus 
supporting their exports. At the current rate, the 
build-up of foreign reserves by East Asian central 
banks (some 530 billion US dollars in 2004) 
finances about three-quarters of the US deficit. 
The dilemma of the Asian central banks is that 
an appreciation of their currencies would not 
only reduce their countries’ external 
competitiveness but would also imply a 
devaluation of their huge dollar reserves in terms 
of national currencies. Although the current 
situation becomes more difficult the longer it 
lasts, it is likely that most Asian central banks will 
continue to accumulate foreign exchange 
reserves at a high pace in the near future. The 
decision of China in July 2005 to suspend the 
dollar peg and to move instead into a managed 
floating regime based on a basket of currencies 
will have only a moderate impact.  
 
Graph 34: Euro-area internal and external balance 
(% of GDP – 1991 to 2004) 
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Source: Commission services. 
External balance in the euro area 
Unlike the United States and the surplus regions, 
the euro-area current account is very close to 
balance (Graph 34). In 2004, the euro area 
current account registered a small surplus of 48 
billion euro, 0.6% of GDP. It had been mildly 
positive for most of the past ten years. The 
achievement of this balanced position is also 
remarkable in the light of the substantial 
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appreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar 
since 2001 – but this appears to have been more 
than compensated by a high global import 
demand, while domestic demand in the euro area 
was weak.  
Intra-euro-area current account balances  
However, the aggregate current account position 
of the euro area hides some substantial 
differences among euro-area Member States. 
Germany alone runs a large current account 
surplus of 80 billion euro (3.7%) of GDP. 
Without this, the euro area would have had a 
negative current account. Other countries, such 
as Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Finland, also have positive balances, but only in 
Finland are the surpluses as high as those of 
Germany in relative terms.  
Table 4: Current account in the euro area 
In billion € 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
BE 11 11 12 9 14 9 
DE -28 -12 -13 -27 48 82 
EL 0 -1 -1 -7 -9 -9 
ES -5 6 1 -20 -18 -34 
FR 1 14 32 17 12 -10 
IE 2 3 1 1 -1 -2 
IT 11 32 23 1 -4 -4 
NL 16 15 10 18 11 13 
AT -4 -4 -2 -2 5 5 
PT -1 -1 -5 -10 -7 -8 
FI 1 4 7 10 10 6 
Euro 
Area 
4 65 65 -10 61 48 
As % of GDP 
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 
BE 5.5 5.1 5.3 3.8 5.2 3.1 
DE -1.6 -0.7 -0.7 -1.3 2.2 3.7 
EL -0.7 -1.0 -1.4 -5.5 -6.3 -5.4 
ES -1.2 1.2 0.2 -3.2 -2.5 -4.1 
FR 0.1 1.1 2.4 1.2 0.8 -0.6 
IE 3.6 4.4 1.9 0.8 -0.9 -1.1 
IT 1.3 3.2 2.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 
NL 5.6 4.9 2.8 4.6 2.6 2.7 
AT -2.7 -2.3 -0.9 -1.1 2.3 2.1 
PT -1.6 -1.3 -4.5 -9.0 -5.8 -6.0 
FI 1.6 4.1 5.8 7.3 7.4 4.3 
Euro 
Area 
0.1 1.1 1.1 -0.1 0.8 0.6 
Source: Commission services. 
Other euro-area countries run significant deficits. 
In the cases of Portugal, Greece and Spain, the 
deficits are of a similar order of magnitude to 
that of the United States. However, such current 
account deficits are to be expected as a part of a 
normal income catching-up process and 
therefore are likely to be relatively 
unproblematic. Furthermore, in the absence of 
intra-euro-area nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations, current account adjustments in 
these countries can only take place via slow 
changes in prices and factor cost.  
Net foreign asset position 
The evidence suggests that the United States 
economy is extremely vulnerable to a fall in 
international investor confidence. However, the 
current account deficit is only one factor 
determining the evolution of the net-foreign-
asset-to-GDP ratio, which is the best indicator 
for assessing the sustainability of the external 
position.
14
 Current account deficits in past 
decades explain why both the euro area and the 
US show negative net foreign asset positions of 
some 15 and 23% of GDP respectively.
15
 
Another factor is obviously GDP growth. With 
nominally constant net assets, higher GDP 
lowers the net-asset-to-GDP ratio.  
The ratio can also be significantly affected by net 
external asset revaluations. The magnitude of 
these revaluations again depends on a number of 
parameters. One aspect is whether the nominal 
rate of return on external assets and liabilities 
differs. For instance it appears that American 
investments abroad, which are concentrated in 
equities, yield a substantially higher return than 
foreign investments in the USA, which mostly 
consist of bonds. The higher the internationally 
held assets and liabilities are, the higher is the 
impact of differentials in the rates of return.  
Finally, and very significantly, the evolution of 
the asset position depends on the exchange rate. 
Just like the nominal rate of return, the impact of 
the exchange rate depends on the composition of 
the international asset holdings. For advanced 
economies like the United States and the euro 
area, foreign assets are usually denominated in 
                                                     
14
 See, Lane, P. and G. Milesi-Ferretti, “A Global 
Perspective on External Positions” in R. Clara, ed. (2005 
forthcoming): G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability 
and Adjustment; Chicago University Press,  accessible at: 
http://www.nber.org/books/curracct/lane-
milesiferretti8-19-05.pdf 
15
  Unlike flow parameters, data on asset stocks are subject 
to substantial uncertainties.  
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foreign currencies; liabilities are denominated in 
the home currency. Consequently, an unexpected 
depreciation (not reflected in ex-ante interest 
differentials) will increase the domestic currency 
rate of return on external assets and hence 
improve the net foreign asset position.
16
 This 
puts a country in the advantageous position that 
depreciation leads to an immediate improvement 
in its net asset position, notably when cross-
country holdings are dominated by fixed interest 
bonds. Investors from the appreciating currency 
would consequently see their assets lose value.  
Table 5 shows that these factors can be 
extremely important at least in the short run. 
Over the last four years, the net-asset-to-GDP 
ratio in the United States and the euro area 
deteriorated at practically the same rate of 5.6 
and 5.8 pp, respectively, in spite of large 
differences in their current account position.  
Table 5: Evolution of net asset ratio in the euro area 
and the United States (2000-2004) 
 
Euro area United States 
Initial net foreign asset-
position 
(1)
 
-9.8 -16.7 
Change in net foreign 
assets 
(1)
 of which 
-5.6 -5.8 
• Cumulative       
current account GDP 
growth 
1.6 -18.8 
• GDP growth 1.4 3.9 
• Capital gains -9.0 10.1 
• Errors, omissions 0.4 -0.9 
Selected parameters 
(2)
 
  
Change in REER 31.5 -14.8 
Stock prices (foreign minus 
domestic) 
4.4 11.6 
Avg. real return on assets -2.7 4.8 
Avg. real return on liabilities -0.5 -0.4 
(1) Percentage of GDP. 
(2) Percent. 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti. 
The United States’ cumulative current account 
deficit of 18.8% of GDP was to a significant 
extent neutralised by the fact that capital gains of 
US-held foreign assets exceeded those of the 
foreign-held US assets by 10% of GDP. This was 
helped significantly by an effective depreciation 
of the dollar by 15% in real terms. In addition, 
US investors enjoyed a markedly higher rate of 
                                                     
16
 Developing economies which are net debtors and whose 
liabilities are primarily denominated in foreign currency 
increase their debt ratio when their currency depreciates.  
return for their foreign assets than foreigners 
yield in the USA.  
The euro area, by contrast, suffered relative 
capital losses far in excess of the cumulative 
current account surplus. Most of the loss is 
explained by a considerable (30%) revaluation of 
the euro over the period in question. Even 
without this, European investments abroad yield 
lower returns than those of their American 
counterparts. Furthermore, low growth reduced 
the euro area’s net foreign asset-to-GDP ratio 
only by 1.4 pp, while the US net asset ratio was 
reduced by nearly 4 pp between 2000 and 2004.  
Graph 35: Change in US net foreign asset position since 
1985 (bn US $ – 1985 to 2003) 
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Source: IMF. 
Like the current account balances, the net asset 
positions in the euro area are far from 
homogenous. While some countries, such as 
Belgium, France and Germany, enjoy positive net 
asset positions, in others such as Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland and Finland, the net asset 
position is highly negative with values of between 
20 and 70% of GDP. It is, however, difficult to 
draw direct conclusions from these figures about 
the sustainability of the external balances for 
individual Member States.
17
  
                                                     
17
 For instance, a Finnish net asset position of minus 150% 
in 2000 was a sign more of economic strength than 
weakness at the time, as it mostly reflected the stock 
market valuation of Nokia.  
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area III/2005 
 
 
 
- 30 - 
Graph 36: Change in German net foreign asset position 
since 1985 (bn US $ – 1985 to 2003) 
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Source: IMF. 
In spite of these recent trends and having a net 
asset imbalance two thirds that of the United 
States, the euro area’s external sustainability is 
not at risk. This is because, in the long term, net 
assets are clearly dominated by current account 
balances. Even an impressive 900 billion dollar in 
capital gains for the US over the last twenty years 
does not change the long-term picture, in 
particular as these gains depend also on short-run 
exchange rate movements (Graph 35). In other 
countries, the situation is comparable (Graph 36). 
Also, unlike the United States, the euro area does 
not need to attract huge sums of foreign capital 
each year. The recent deterioration of the net 
asset position is almost exclusively due to a euro 
appreciation. Even a stabilisation, let alone a 
depreciation of the euro would substantially 
improve the euro area’s net asset position.  
2. Correcting the global imbalances 
While the analysis of the evolution of net assets 
modifies the estimation of the necessary current 
account improvement, the United States external 
balance is clearly unsustainable. The current 
account does not need to be zero to stabilise the 
debt ratio. This could already be achieved at a 
deficit of 1% of GDP
18
, but depends on US 
growth, as well as the degree to which it can 
maintain the unequal exchange of high-yielding 
foreign assets against low-yielding US assets. 
                                                     
18
  Roubini, N. and B. Sester: The US as a Net Debtor: The 
Sustainability of US External Imbalances, mimeo Nov. 
2004. http://www.stern.nyu.edu/globalmacro/Roubini-
Setser-US-External-Imbalances.pdf. 
Even in the best of cases, there needs to be a 
substantial improvement in the current account.  
It would certainly make matters more difficult if 
foreign buyers of US assets achieved higher 
returns on their investments. If investors 
demanded a higher risk premium, making the US 
foreign position less tenable, a disorderly 
unwinding could ensue.  
It is not easy to determine exactly what impact an 
adjustment of external imbalances on the euro 
area would have, because it hinges on the 
underlying shifts in economic parameters as well 
as the size and speed of adjustments in the 
exchange rate. It is unlikely that the current 
account gap now prevailing in the United States 
could be corrected by exchange-rate adjustments 
alone, even if the dollar devaluation were very 
large. An important part of the rebalancing must 
come from changes in economic fundamentals, 
i.e. changes in savings rates and productivity.  
Adjustment channels 
Before discussing possible scenarios to correct 
the imbalances it is useful to review briefly the 
various channels by which adjustment, and 
notably a rising euro exchange rate, would affect 
the euro area economy.  
Trade channel: An appreciation of the euro 
increases the price of exports and lowers the 
price of imports. Over the medium term, this 
relative loss in European price competitiveness 
will have a negative impact on the trade balance, 
the magnitude of which is influenced by a 
number of parameters. These are the extent of 
the pass-through of the exchange rate to import 
prices; the degree to which exporters reduce their 
profit margins and cut their prices to maintain 
market shares; the relative elasticities of export 
and import substitution; and the starting 
position. In addition, the reaction of the trade 
balance to exchange rate changes depends on the 
lag times between placing international orders 
and receiving the products. Because exports tend 
to be denominated in domestic currency (i.e. 
euros) and imports in foreign currencies, the 
immediate impact might even be a widening of 
the trade balance.  
Purchasing power channel: While a euro 
appreciation leads to a loss of competitiveness 
for producers of tradable goods and services, 
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consumers might actually benefit. A rising euro 
means lower import prices and, hence, an 
increase in purchasing power.  
Asset price channel: As seen from the euro area, 
liabilities are usually denominated in euros, while 
assets are denominated in dollars. Mechanically, a 
dollar devaluation leads to a proportional 
reduction in the value of dollar-denominated 
assets. This in turn reduces the value of euro area 
companies with US assets, insofar as they are not 
hedged, and might limit their capacity to borrow 
and invest. On the other hand, these companies 
might benefit from the increased competitiveness 
of their foreign subsidiaries.  
Interest rate channel: A fall in the dollar triggered 
by reduced demand or an increased risk premium 
for US-held assets would lead to higher interest 
rates in the US and lower interest rates in Europe 
through increased demand for euro-denominated 
bonds. This effect would be reinforced, if 
investors expected further euro appreciations in 
the future. This channel would benefit Europe 
unless the demand for a higher risk premium also 
spilled over into the euro area, which would have 
the effect of reducing investment.  
Relative price channel: A change in exchange 
rates will not affect all sectors equally. Prices of 
tradable goods and services are likely to fall 
noticeably, while prices for non-tradable goods 
will remain practically unchanged. Even within 
the tradable sectors, the impacts can vary 
depending on market structure, import and 
export ratios, relative exposure to the dollar, and 
price elasticity. In the wake of the euro 
appreciation, substantial shifts of consumption 
and production could take place between the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors.   
Confidence channel: A euro appreciation is also 
likely to affect consumer and producer 
confidence. Much depends on whether the 
appreciation is the result of an improved outlook 
and hence capital inflows for the euro area or the 
result of a deterioration in the USA. In the latter 
case, private sector confidence is likely to fall, in 
the light of strong linkages between US and 
European financial markets. If falling confidence 
leads to lower spending, and hence lower 
imports, the contractionary effect of lower 
exports to the USA might be aggravated. A 
countervailing effect would be a rise in consumer 
confidence as a result of lower import prices. 
Adjustment scenarios 
Three core scenarios can be identified that 
reduce global imbalances without involving the 
euro area as a policy actor.  A first scenario 
involves the reduction of US internal imbalances 
through an increase in the household savings 
rate. Table 6 shows the result of such a scenario 
using the DG ECFIN’s QUEST model. This 
scenario (like the following two) is normalised to 
achieve a 0.5% of GDP reduction in the US 
current account deficit in the third year after the 
policy change. The scenario requires a substantial 
6% reduction in private consumption. In the first 
year US GDP falls by 3.8%. This drop is 
dampened in the following years as a result of 
lower real interest rates. The improvement in the 
trade balance takes place mostly through lower 
imports amidst lower domestic demand.  Clearly, 
the scenario is costly in terms of GDP loss. It 
also has sizeable spill-overs into the euro area, 
which suffers from a loss of its GDP by 0.5 % 
after three years, as its trade balance deteriorates 
in the in the order of 0.65% of GDP. The costs 
of this scenario become even more substantial if 
one keeps in mind that the required current 
account adjustment for the United States needs 
to be significantly larger than the values assumed 
in the scenario.  
Table 6: US savings rate increase (1)(2) 
 Year 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP -0.83 -1.01 -0.51 
 
Trade 
balance -0.35 -0.66 -0.65 
     
USA GDP -3.84 -2.57 -2.58 
 
Trade 
balance 
0.59 0.50 0.50 
Exchange rate (€/$) -3.71 -2.19 -0.06 
(1) Percentage deviation from baseline. 
(2) 6 percent reduction in private consumption. 
A second scenario that is based on correcting US 
internal imbalances is a fiscal contraction. To 
achieve an improvement in the current account 
by 0.5% of GDP, the United States needs to 
increase its taxes by 6.5% of GDP in the 
QUEST simulation (Table 7). Like the previous 
scenario, the current account improvement stems 
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from a strong reduction in domestic demand. 
While the output reduction in the United States 
is similar to that of the higher savings rate 
scenario, negative spill-overs of US budget 
consolidation into the euro area are relatively 
smaller, because the Euro area benefits from 
lower interest rates and import prices.  
Table 7: US fiscal contraction (1) 
 Year 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP -0.23 -0.21 -0.11 
 
Trade 
balance 
-0.19 -0.45 -0.47 
     
USA GDP -1.74 -1.98 -2.63 
 
Trade 
balance 0.31 0.42 0.50 
Exchange rate (€/$) -2.81 -2.16 -0.98 
(1) Fiscal contraction of 6.5% of GDP modelled as increase in 
labour income tax and corporate taxes (by 3.25% of GDP each). 
A third scenario considers the possibility of a 
reduction of global imbalances as a result of 
lower savings in Asia. This is modelled as an 
increase in Asian imports by 10% (Table 8). In 
this case GDP and exports rise in both the 
United States and the euro area compared to the 
baseline. Due to the higher export share, the euro 
area benefits more than the USA from this 
situation.  In addition, the United States is more 
affected than the euro area by the dampening 
effect of rising interest rates.  
Table 8: Reduction in Asian savings rate (1) 
 Year 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP 0.64 0.34 0.38 
 
Trade 
balance 0.64 0.64 0.68 
     
USA GDP 0.34 0.16 0.18 
 
Trade 
balance 
0.44 0.50 0.50 
Exchange rate (€/$) -0.62 -0.56 -0.48 
(1) Increase in imports of Asian region (non-Japan) of 10 %. 
Even though, net asset positions apart, the euro 
area’s current account is in balance and is not 
implicated in the bilateral imbalances between 
the United States and its lenders, the costs of a 
disorderly unwinding could be substantial for 
Europe, if it is accompanied by a recession in the 
United States.  
It is not clear, what combination of the three 
core adjustment scenarios just described is the 
most likely. Various authors have made the case 
that the driver of global imbalances lies in either 
the US fiscal deficit, the lack of US savings, East 
Asian central bank interventions, a global savings 
glut, a lack of global investment opportunities, or 
a combination of these. Other authors argue that 
global imbalances are not even a problem, but 
rather the result of optimal resource allocation. 
The solution to the imbalances varies depends on 
the viewpoint. A hard landing with spill-overs 
into the rest of the world is not therefore 
inevitable.  
As the simulations have shown, one important 
factor in determining the outcome is the degree 
to which an adjustment in the US external 
balance would be accompanied by a reduction in 
the imbalances of the lender countries. A 
reduction in the current account surplus of East 
Asia and the Middle East would ease the 
adjustment pressure on the euro area 
proportionately. This would mean that, from a 
European perspective at least part of the shock 
of a rising euro-dollar exchange rate would be 
cushioned by a simultaneous rise in Asian 
currencies. Even in a benign scenario, a 
correction for the US deficit is likely to be 
accompanied by a sizeable devaluation of the 
dollar, with an according rise in the exchange rate 
of the euro. This exchange rate realignment 
would require substantial adjustments in the euro 
area to an altered price structure.  
3. European options to address global 
imbalances 
Policy scenarios  
It has been suggested (mostly by US authors) 
that the relative attractiveness of the United 
States to absorb global excess savings is partly 
linked to the unattractiveness of investing in 
Europe. This could be eased by higher growth 
rates in the euro area and higher net imports.  
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies might 
be considered to be the fastest way to bring 
about higher growth and import demand in the 
euro area. Such policies can, however, only 
induce a cyclical acceleration of growth, while 
having no or even a negative impact on long-
term growth. As the short-run expansionary 
effect of the policy change wears out and turns 
negative, so would the increased import demand. 
Fiscal and monetary policies therefore would not 
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bring about a lasting improvement in the US 
current account deficit. Furthermore, there is no 
room for manœuvre on the fiscal side in the euro 
area and monetary policy is already 
accommodating. 
Although the role of structural reforms in 
helping to reduce current account imbalances has 
taken a prominent place in the policy debate, 
empirical research on the issue has so far 
remained relatively sparse. A common tenet in 
policy circles seems to be that growth-enhancing 
structural reforms in the euro area will foster 
euro-area import demand and thereby contribute 
to reduce the US trade deficit. Neither economic 
theory nor empirical evidence provide much 
support to the idea of a long-term negative 
relation between growth and the level of the 
current account. However, theory does not rule 
out the possibility that reforms may temporarily 
bring a deterioration of the trade balance by 
providing a bigger stimulus to demand than to 
supply (see Box 2).  
Labour and product market reforms rank among 
the most important means of raising euro-area 
growth in the medium run. However, QUEST 
simulations show that such reforms, while lifting 
the euro area’s growth potential, have very 
limited implications for trade balances.  
Table 9: Effect of euro-area wage reductions (1)(2)  
 Year: 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP 0.41 0.78 1.00 
 
Trade 
balance -0.11 -0.19 -0.22 
     
USA GDP 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 
Trade 
balance 0.04 0.05 0.07 
Exchange rate (€/$) -0.30 -0.11 -0.01 
(1) Reduction in ex-ante wages by 3.7%. 
(2) Percentage deviation from baseline. 
Table 9 shows the simulation of labour market 
reforms that lead to a 1% increase in euro area 
GDP after three years. This is modelled as a 
change in the wage-setting rule, which lowers ex 
ante wages by 3.7%. Wage moderation stimulates 
investment spending and leads to an increase in 
output and employment levels and to lower 
unemployment, which also boosts private 
consumption in spite of the original income loss. 
The scenario results in a negligible appreciation 
of the euro-dollar exchange rate, and practically 
no improvement in the US trade balance. This 
result is intuitive, because the scenario has no 
built-in mechanism that would drive aggregate 
demand to rise faster than aggregate supply. In 
addition, it should be noted that only a part of 
the changes in the euro area current account is 
mirrored in the United States’ current account, 
because other countries, notably European states 
outside the euro area, absorb a substantial share 
of the current account impulse.  
A slightly larger current account deficit can be 
generated by product market reforms, which 
increase competition amongst producers of 
goods and services and increase the process 
responsiveness of demand. Such a liberalisation 
can be simulated in QUEST as a reduction in 
mark-up prices.
19
 As a consequence, firms 
increase output – together with investment – 
while real wages also increase in the medium 
term. The boost in consumption due to higher 
employment, higher wages and lower prices 
exceeds the increase in GDP, leading to a slightly 
negative trade effect in Europe. The euro 
appreciates vis-à-vis the dollar and the US trade 
balance shows a small improvement (Table 10). 
Clearly, however, this scenario does not do 
enough to solve the US current account problem.  
Table 10: Effect of euro-area product market 
reforms(1)(2) 
 Year: 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP 0.63 0.72 1.00 
 
Trade 
balance -0.42 -0.95 -1.05 
     
USA GDP -0.16 -0.15 -0.11 
 
Trade 
balance 
0.11 0.32 0.32 
Exchange rate (€/$) -8.21 -7.89 -7.37 
(1) Reduction in mark-ups over marginal costs by 5.2 percentage 
points. 
(2) Percentage deviation from baseline. 
 
The only viable euro-area policy option to affect 
the US current account deficit over a more 
extended time period is for international investor 
preferences to switch from the United States to 
the euro area. This can be modelled as a higher 
risk premium for investment in the United States  
                                                     
19
 This requires a decrease in the mark-up over marginal 
costs by 5.2 percentage points. 
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Box 2: Structural reforms and current account imbalances: some recent literature  
 
The available empirical evidence suggests that structural reforms in the euro area may temporarily alleviate current 
account imbalances although their effect may be only modest and depends on the types of reforms considered. 
Furthermore, in most model simulations, it seems that the only way in which reforms can be shown to have a 
significant negative effect on the euro-area current account is by making the assumption that reforms will foster 
capital inflows into the euro area.  
 
Kennedy and Slok (2005) explore the link between current account balances and structural reforms with a panel 
regression on 14 OECD countries. The authors find no support for the idea of a systematic link between the current 
account position and trend growth. Product and financial market deregulation, however, may have a negative impact 
on the current account. In contrast, regression coefficients are not meaningful in the case of labour market indicators 
and show a wrong sign in the case of FDI restrictions. The authors conclude that structural reforms may impact the 
current account in the short- to medium-run although the link may be tenuous and may vary with the types of 
reforms put in place.  
 
Faruqee et al. (2005) use a variant of the GEM model of the International Monetary Fund to simulate scenarios of 
adjustment to global imbalances, among them the possible contribution of structural reforms in the euro area. They 
conclude that labour market reforms can only have a limited impact on the euro-area’s net saving, particularly if 
uncertainties related to the reform process weigh on consumer confidence. Product market reform may have a 
somewhat more significant effect on the current account but spillovers from the euro area to the USA remain fairly 
small and seem to partly depend on concurrent assumptions regarding increased appetite for euro-area assets. Also 
based on the GEM model, IMF (2005) concludes that the build-up of the US trade imbalances and the rise in the 
dollar in the late 1990s can be explained by the combination of a productivity shock in the USA and increased 
appetite for US assets (in most macroeconomic models, the impact of productivity shocks on exchange rates and 
trade balances are relatively modest). Following this line of reasoning, a pick-up in productivity in the euro area 
combined with increased demand for euro-area assets would help restore global imbalances. 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a; 2005b) construct a simple general equilibrium model with fixed endowments and 
assess the changes in relative prices that would result from a closing of the US current account deficit. The central 
assumption is that current account imbalances are resolved by a shift in demand from the USA to the rest of the 
world. Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the exercise: 
 
  First, the magnitude of the required depreciation of the dollar real effective exchange rate would be substantial, 
ranging from 15% to 30% depending on the model assumption. This shows that an adjustment to global current 
account imbalances cannot take place without significant price changes. 
 
  Second, whereas discussions on the implications of the adjustment to current account imbalances tend to focus 
on the tradable sector, reducing the US trade deficit will also have a strong impact on prices in the non-tradable 
sector both in the USA and in the rest of the world. A reversal of the US trade deficit will weigh on the euro-
area’s export sector but also give a boost to its non-tradable sector.  
 
  Finally, the necessary dollar depreciation will be larger if prices are sticky. On the other hand, it could be 
mitigated by factor mobility across sectors and an acceleration of productivity gains in the rest of the world (but 
only provided that it takes places in the non-tradable sector).  
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compared to that in Europe, for instances as a 
result of structural reforms (Table 11). 
Table 11: Product market reforms and risk premium 
shock (1) 
 Year 1 2 3 
Euro area GDP 0.11 0.46 1.00 
 
Trade 
balance -0.61 -1.65 -1.71 
     
USA GDP -0.07 -0.11 -0.18 
 
Trade 
balance 
0.12 0.63 0.69 
Exchange rate (€/$) -14.50 -14.88 -15.06 
(1) Percentage deviation from baseline. 
The effects of the scenario on the euro area 
follow several channels. The euro appreciation 
results in a loss of competitiveness, leading to a 
notably negative trade balance. The negative 
impact of this effect on GDP is, however, more 
than offset by higher consumption due to lower 
import prices and higher investment as a result of 
capital inflows in the wake of shifting investor 
preferences. Notably, if combined with structural 
reforms, this scenario increases euro area GDP 
despite the substantial negative trade shock. 
The USA, on the other hand would improve its 
trade balance although owing to the dollar 
depreciation, the nominal trade balance would 
only improve by about half the real shift in trade. 
The negative impact of the interest rate premium 
and higher import prices, however, reduce GDP. 
But even the risk premium scenario shows that 
the impact that the euro area can have on the US 
deficit is very limited. 
Desirability of euro-area options 
It is, of course, one question to examine what 
policies might create a euro-area current account 
deficit, and ostensibly reduce global imbalances. 
Whether it is desirable to deliberately create a 
current account deficit is a separate matter. 
Clearly the policies that lift growth potential, 
such as product and labour market reforms 
should be pursued in their own right. The 
benefits of a current account deficit are less 
obvious.  
First, with the East Asian and Middle Eastern 
current account surplus unchanged, a higher 
euro-area deficit would mean that the imbalances 
are carried by more shoulders, namely the United 
States and the euro area together. This might 
increase the sustainability of the global financial 
system somewhat, but does not remove its 
fundamental problem. If the euro area 
contributes to a further accumulation of large 
negative global net asset positions, the eventual 
global adjustments might be only delayed rather 
than avoided altogether, and ultimately become 
more violent. 
Second, it must be considered that the euro area 
starting position from which to create a current 
account deficit is not as comfortable as is often 
suggested. While the situation is clearly not as 
menacing as that of the United States, it 
nevertheless limits the ability of the euro area to 
borrow large sums over an extended period. 
Third, the desirability of a current account deficit 
in the euro area is also determined by the 
structural differences between the euro area and 
the lender countries. Two aspects appear 
particularly pertinent. First, in terms of the global 
allocation of resources it is odd that poor labour-
abundant countries lend money to wealthy 
capital-abundant countries. The flow of 
resources would be more efficient the other way 
round. Second, in order to prepare for the effects 
of an ageing society and the foreseeable need to 
finance pensions, it is economically efficient to 
build up net assets in younger and more dynamic 
countries.
20
 The build-up of a net debtor position 
by contrast exacerbates the financial problems 
associated with the ageing of the population.  
Finally, the fact that only a part of a euro area 
current account deficit actually improves the 
current account in the United States means that 
there is a risk that not only might it not prevent 
or significantly mitigate a disorderly unwinding of 
the US imbalances, but might also leave the euro 
area worse prepared than it otherwise would be.  
                                                     
20
 This argument might not hold strictly for China, which as 
a result of its one-child policy is also facing a substantial 
ageing problem. In the light of the enormous labour 
market reserve, however, even here the growth is likely to 
continue at a rapid pace for a foreseeable future.  
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4. Conclusions 
The counterpart to the US current account 
deficit is to be found in Asia (which is posting 
large surpluses) and not in the euro area (where 
the current account is close to balance). A 
transfer of demand from the US to Asia is 
therefore most important for an orderly 
adjustment to the imbalances. The contribution 
of the euro area to this process can only be 
relatively modest particularly since demographic 
ageing requires the euro area to improve its net 
foreign asset position and its starting position is 
negative. As a consequence, a reduction of 
external imbalances will require a much steeper 
devaluation of the dollar against Asian currencies 
than against the euro. However, if imbalances 
were to unwind disorderly and the Asian 
currencies do not appreciate, the burden of the 
dollar depreciation could fall disproportionately 
on the euro.  
The euro-area’s macroeconomic policies are very 
restricted. There is no room for manœuvre on  
the fiscal side and monetary policy is already 
accommodating. Structural reforms in Europe 
could help the rebalancing process to the extent 
that they boost domestic demand. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that their 
contribution to reducing the US deficit will 
probably be modest (even if their positive impact 
on the euro-area economy is substantial). 
This does not mean that the role of structural 
reforms in the euro area should be downplayed. 
In addition to boosting long-term growth, more 
flexibility would enhance the economy's 
resilience in face of shocks. An unwinding of 
global imbalances can potentially imply massive 
restructuring of the euro area economy, 
accompanied by the necessity to move factors 
from one type of output to another. Where 
factor mobility is low, the misallocation and loss 
in output and welfare, respectively, are likely to 
be high. Reforms that reduce rigidities may 
therefore prove to be crucial in the event of a 
disorderly rebalancing of current accounts. 
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V. Key indicators for the euro area 
 
1 Output  2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Industrial confidence 1.1 Balance -10 -12 -11 -9 -11 -10 -8 -8 -7 
 Industrial production 1.2 mom % ch 0.2 -0.9 0.2 0.8 -0.4 0.4 0.2   
  
 2001 2002 2003 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Gross domestic product 1.3 Qtr. % ch     0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3  
2 Private consumption  2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Consumer confidence 2.1 Balance -6 -11 -18 -13 -15 -15 -15 -15 -15 
 Retail sales 2.2  mom % ch 1.2 1.1 0.1 -1.1 1.2 0.0 -0.5 0.9  
  
 2001 2002 2003 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Private consumption 2.3 Qtr. % ch 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 -0.1  
3 Investment  2001 2002 2003 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Capacity utilization 3.1 % 83.5 81.2 80.7 81.1 82.0 82.1 81.9 81.2 81.2 
 Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 Qtr. % ch -0.3 -2.7 -0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 -0.2 0.2  
 Change in stocks 3.3 % of GDP -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1  
4 Labour market  2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Unemployment 4.1 % 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.5 8.6  
  
 2001 2002 2003 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Employment 4.2 Ann. % ch 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8   
 Shortage of labour 4.3 % 7.8 3.8 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.4  
 Wages 4.4 Ann. % ch 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8    
5 International transactions   2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Export order books 5.1 Balance -14 -22 -24 -18 -19 -20 -18 -18 -17 
 World trade 5.2 Bn. EUR 121 125 132 154 156 159 157   
 Exports of goods 5.3 Bn. EUR 767.4 776.9 1038.6 99.4 101.0 100.5 101.8   
 Imports of goods 5.4 Bn. EUR 802.2 781.6 970.4 95.0 96.7 97.1 100.9   
 Trade balance 5.5 Bn. EUR -34.8 -4.7 68.2 4.4 4.2 3.4 1.0   
  
 2001 2002 2003 04Q2 04Q3 04Q4 05Q1 05Q2 05Q3 
 Exports of goods and services 5.6 Qtr. % ch 3.4 1.7 0.2 2.7 1.3 0.5 -0.7 2.1  
 Imports of goods and services 5.7 Qtr. % ch 2.1 -1.6 2.1 2.7 2.5 1.4 -1.4 2.1  
  
 2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Current account balance 5.8 Bn. EUR 2.0 44.9 18.1 0.8 1.9 -1.0 -5.9   
 Direct investment (net) 5.9 Bn. EUR -104.6 -11.0 -18.4 -6.4 3.3 -9.9 -80.1   
 Portfolio investment (net) 5.10 Bn. EUR 36.5 64.4 -9.4 -2.8 22.7 102.6 73.7   
6 Prices   2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 HICP 6.1 Ann. % ch 2.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 
 Core HICP 6.2 Ann. % ch 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4  
 Producer prices 6.3 Ann. % ch 2.2 1.7 1.6 4.3 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.0  
 Import prices6.4 Ann. % ch 100.2 97.9 102.5 101.7 101.5 103.9    
7 Monetary and financial indicators   2001 2002 2003 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 
 Interest rate (3 months) 7.1 % p.a. 4.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 
 Bond yield (10 years) 7.2 % p.a. 5.0 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 
 ECB repo rate 7.3  % p.a. 3.25 2.75  2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
 Stock markets 7.4  Index 4047 3053 2420 3014 3021 3152 3268 3303 3352 
 M3 7.5 Ann. % ch 5.3 5.6 7.8 6.9 7.2 7.6 7.9   
 Credit to private sector (loans) 7.6 Ann. % ch 7.9 7.7 5.0 7.4 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.4  
 Exchange rate USD/EUR 7.7 Value 0.90 0.95 1.13 1.29 1.27 1.22 1.20 1.23 1.23 
 Nominal effective exchange rate 7.8 Index 91.5 95.1 106.4 111.6 110.5 107.6 108.3 109.1 108.5 
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Number Indicator Note Source 
1 Output   
1.1 Industrial confidence 
indicator  
Industry survey, average of balances to replies on production expectations, 
order books, and stocks (the latter with inverted sign) 
ECFIN 
1.2 Industrial production  Volume, excluding construction, wda Eurostat 
1.3 Gross domestic product  Volume (1995), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
2 Private consumption   
2.1 Consumer confidence 
indicator  
Consumer survey, average of balances to replies on four questions (financial 
and economic situation, unemployment, savings over next 12 months) 
ECFIN 
2.2 Retail sales Volume, excluding motor vehicles, wda Eurostat 
2.3 Private consumption Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3 Investment   
3.1 Capacity utilisation  In percent of full capacity, manufacturing, seasonally adjusted, survey data 
(collected in each January, April, July and October). 
ECFIN 
3.2 Gross fixed capital 
formation  
Volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
3.3 Change in stocks In percent of GDP, volume (1995 prices), seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4 Labour market   
4.1 Unemployment  In percent of total workforce, ILO definition, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
4.2 Employment  Number of employees, partially estimated, seasonally adjusted ECB/ 
Eurostat 
4.3 Shortage of labour Percent of firms in the manufacturing sector reporting a shortage of labour 
(unfilled job openings) as a constraint to production, seasonally adjusted  
ECFIN 
4.4 Wages  Not fully harmonised concept, but representative for each Member State 
(mostly hourly earnings) 
ECFIN 
5 International transactions  
5.1 Export order books Industry survey; balance of positive and negative replies, seasonally adjusted ECFIN 
5.2 Exports of goods Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob Eurostat 
5.3 Imports of goods  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, cif Eurostat 
5.4 Trade balance Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area trade, fob-cif Eurostat 
5.5 Exports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.6 Imports of goods and 
services  
Volume (1995 prices), including intra euro-area trade, seasonally adjusted Eurostat 
5.7 Current account balance  Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions; before 1997 partly 
estimated 
ECB 
5.8 Direct investment   (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
5.9 Portfolio investment  (net) Bn. EUR, excluding intra euro-area transactions ECB 
6 Prices   
6.1 HICP  Harmonised index of consumer prices Eurostat 
6.2 Core HICP Harmonised index of consumer prices, excluding energy and unprocessed 
food 
Eurostat 
6.3 Producer prices Without construction Eurostat 
6.4 Import prices Import unit value index for goods  Eurostat 
7 Monetary and financial indicators  
7.1 Interest rate  Percent p.a., 3-month interbank money market rate, period averages Datastream 
7.2 Bond yield Percent p.a., 10-year government bond yields, lowest level prevailing in the 
euro area, period averages 
Datastream 
7.3 ECB repo rate Percent p.a., minimum bid rate of the ECB, end of period Datastream 
7.4 Stock markets  DJ Euro STOXX50 index, period averages Datastream 
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7.5 M3  Seasonally adjusted moving average moving average (3 last months)  ECB 
7.6 Credit to private sector 
(loans) 
MFI loans to euro-area residents excluding MFIs and general government, 
monthly values: month end values, annual values: annual averages 
ECB 
7.7 Exchange rate USD/EUR  Period averages ECB 
7.8 Nominal effective exchange 
rate 
Against 13 other industrialised countries, double export weighted, 1995 = 
100, increase (decrease): appreciation (depreciation) 
ECFIN 
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